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Emperor Charles V and Sultan Süleyman I: A Comparative Analysis

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**EMPEROR CHARLES V AND SULTAN SÜLEYMAN I:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

By

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B.A., History, University of New Mexico, 2011

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comparative analysis of Emperor Charles V and Sultan Süleyman I. Both men were archetypes of their age and perfectly demonstrated the perceived struggle between the East and West, Christianity and Islam. These two were the first generation of sovereigns of the early modern period, and throughout their time as monarchs each sought to counteract and dominate the other by utilizing rhetoric, titulature, propaganda, regalia, and iconography.

The texts and images used throughout serve as the best representatives of the Sultan's and Emperor's theatrical conflict. The first chapter focuses on the evolution of the perception of the Turk in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The second examines the relationship between Charles, Süleyman, and their advisers while analyzing both ruler's sovereign claims. The final chapter analyzes the importance of religion in helping Charles and Süleyman exert their power and authority, and their conflict with heretics.

Studying Charles V and Süleyman I in a comparative aspect is useful because both rulers were excellent examples of the changes happening at the beginning of the early modern period. These sovereigns reveal the aspirations and beliefs of their cultures, faiths,

and nations, because on their perceived world stage they thought of themselves as ultimate representatives in the struggle between the East and West. Although these two men, their advisers, and subsequent scholars have emphasized differences, their interactions with one another and their similarities are what is most striking in this study.

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Introduction

The early sixteenth century was vital in the formation of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. For both regions, this was a time of technological, artistic, and intellectual innovation as the spread of new ideals, inventions, and beliefs helped usher in the early modern period. Although this century marked a significant shift from the Middle Ages, it was also informed heavily by medieval traditions and reveals that the sixteenth century was a *mélange* of modernization and transformation moderated by deeply embedded medieval principles. The two individuals who best represent this period's unique ideals and customs are Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and Ottoman Sultan Süleyman. Both men were archetypes of their age and perfectly demonstrated the perceived struggle between the East and the West, Christianity and Islam. Charles and Süleyman were the first generation of sovereigns of the early modern period, and throughout their time as monarchs each sought to counteract and dominate the other.

During the early modern period, the Europeans and Ottomans built up an ideology and rhetoric perpetuating the dichotomy between the East and West and Muslims and Christians. Ever since the Crusades, the Europeans expressed their negative perception of the Turks, and by the time Mehmed II conquered Constantinople in 1453 the Ottomans became the permanent Turkish threat. By the sixteenth century, especially due to the Renaissance, European writers referred to and portrayed the Ottomans as barbarians and enemies of the faith. This perception continued into the modern period, as the divide between the barbaric East and civilized West was further emphasized by Western historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Only within the past few decades have scholars started to negate this artificial separation between Europe and the Middle East.

Despite the numerous differences between Charles and Süleyman as rulers, their similarities are striking and of relevance in helping break down the hard line between the East and West. While they and their propagandists tended to highlight their various dissimilarities, the Emperor and Sultan tended to mirror each other, especially in their youth, with their aspirations, claims, rhetoric, iconography, and ideology. During the first half of both men's reigns, they were under the influence of their advisers who believed that both monarchs were destined for universal sovereignty based on prophecies that circulated throughout Christendom and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Charles and Süleyman utilized similar tactics to express their dominion and successes over the other. It was Süleyman, however, who was the most powerful and successful sovereign in Europe and the Middle East due to the makeup of the Ottoman government and its relationship with Islam.

The traditional narrative of the Ottoman Empire presented the sixteenth century, specifically Süleyman's reign, as a "Golden Age," and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as eras of decline. According to historian Suraiya Faroqhi, during Süleyman's rule and then immediately after contemporary Ottoman writers portrayed his sultanate as a golden period, and lamented that they lived in a time of decline. She argues that subsequent historians have taken these sources at face value, and based off of these texts they have promulgated this narrative.¹ Although the power and authority of the sultan did deteriorate during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this does not mean that the actual empire was in decline. Süleyman's sultanate was indeed a highpoint for the absolute authority of the sultans, but also marks the beginning of the increase in the influence of advisers and grand viziers, which led to the deterioration of the sultan's power in the following centuries.

¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 75-76.

Charles presents a problem of interpretation for historians, because he is an elusive and multifaceted character much like the territories that he ruled over, and can be presented in a variety of ways. Due to Charles inheriting incredibly diverse kingdoms like the Netherlands and Spain and his election to the position of Holy Roman Emperor in the Germanies, his legacy varies from place to place. The year 2000 witnessed the 500 year anniversary of the birth of Charles. To commemorate this occasion the cities of Toledo, Bonn, Vienna, and Ghent cooperated in staging a quincentenary exhibition including festivals, displays of art, conferences, and various publications. C. Scott Dixon mentions in his article “Charles V and the Historians: Some Recent German Works on the Emperor and His Reign” that initially the basic idea was to “recreate a general sense of the massive multinational imperium:” however, this aim proved impossible due to “local flavour, national identities and the fortunes of history.” Therefore spectators encountered four separate images of Charles’s character and reign based on the different territories. Despite Charles posing somewhat of an interpretational problem for scholars today, he is a perfect representation and product of his time and studying him in a comparative relationship with Süleyman helps break down the artificial divide between the East and West.

Texts and images that reflected Süleyman’s and Charles’s aspirations and assertions through rhetoric, titulature, ideology, iconography, and imagery served as the main criteria in choosing primary sources. Since these two men never actually came into contact, they tended to interact through propaganda and large displays of grandeur and power. Therefore, the quotes and images utilized throughout serve as the best representatives of the Sultan’s and Emperor’s theatrical conflict. The first chapter tracts ideas of men from men like Luther,

Guicciardini, and Ibn Zunbul that reveal the general opinions of Europeans and Muslims, but also reflect the intellectual atmosphere at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Studying Charles V and Süleyman I in a comparative aspect is useful because both rulers were excellent examples of the changes happening at the beginning of the early modern period. These sovereigns reveal the aspirations and beliefs of their cultures, faiths, and nations, and on their perceived world stage they thought of themselves as ultimate representatives in the struggle between the East and West. While these two men, their advisers, and subsequent scholars have emphasized differences, their interactions with one another and their similarities are what is most striking in this study. Comparison helps break down the artificial divide that has been perpetuated for centuries between western Europeans and the Ottoman Turks.

Chapter 1: The Evolution of the Perception of the Turk in the Early Sixteenth Century

Towards the end of the fifteenth century the Ottomans emerged as a major force on the European political stage, and by the sixteenth century they became the embodiment of Islamdom and the foe of Christendom.² While the fifteenth century was vital in helping establish the Ottomans as an empire and legitimate threat to the east and west, it was the beginning decades of the sixteenth century that witnessed the true blossoming of Ottoman power and influence. Before Süleyman helped the empire to grow to its largest size, his father's brief eight-year reign turned the Ottoman Empire from a marginal Muslim state into the central power of the Islamic world. It was Selim's military victories against the rival Safavid Shi'a in Iran and the Mamluks of Egypt that enabled Süleyman to act as the defender of Islam against her foes, especially the infidel Christians. Even though Selim and his father Bayezid II did not direct much of their attention toward Latin Christendom during their reigns, the discussion of the Turk was a significant topic for western Europeans.

Mehmed II (r. 1444-46 and 1451-81) and the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 was not only a turning point for the Ottoman Empire, but also for western Europe, since this triumph helped establish the Ottomans as the permanent Muslim enemy in the minds of Christians. The following century was the first to witness a real concern over the Turkish advance among Europeans, and this continued into the early modern period. However, even though the West considered Mehmed to be a menace and enemy of the faith, he and his successors were also able to successfully establish relationships, and even alliances, with European nations like Venice and France.

² Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 119; Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 131.

Although there was interaction between the Ottomans and the Europeans since the end of the fourteenth century, Mehmed's reign marked an increase in European artistic patronage and cultural interaction between the two. The art produced in the Italian peninsula in the mid-fifteenth century greatly intrigued the sultan, and by the end of the 1470s he concentrated his growing patronage on Florence and Venice.³ In 1479, Mehmed sent an envoy to Venice to request the services of an artist talented in portraiture, and the Venetian government sent Gentile Bellini (c.1429-1507).⁴ Throughout Bellini's stay in Istanbul he produced a variety of artwork including a stunning portrait of the sultan (Fig. 1), and a beautiful image of a member of the Ottoman court serving as a scribe (Fig. 2). While Bellini was not the only European under Mehmed's commission in Istanbul between 1460 and 1480, his artwork is a wonderful representation of the cultural and artistic interaction that existed between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Even though the relationship between the Ottomans and European-Christians was often predicated on war, it was also characterized by diplomacy and artistic exchange.

³ Elizabeth Rodini, "The Sultan's Truce Face? Gentile Bellini, Mehmet II, and the Values of Verisimilitude," in *The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450-1750: Visual Imagery before Orientalism*, ed. James G. Harper (England: Ashgate, 2011), 24-25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.



Figure 1. Gentile Bellini, *The Sultan Mehmet II*, 1480. Oil on canvas, 69.9 x 52.1 cm. The National Gallery, London (NG3099). From: The British Museum Online, <https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/gentile-bellini-the-sultan-mehmet-ii> (accessed June 06, 2017).

Sultan Mehmed II invited Venetian artist, Gentile Bellini, to Constantinople in order to paint portraits of the Ottoman court.



Figure 2. Gentile Bellini, *Seated Scribe*, 1480. Pen in brown ink with watercolor and gold on paper, 18.2 x 14 x 2.6 cm (7 3/16 x 5 1/2 x 1 in.) Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston (P15e8). From: The Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum Online, <http://www.gardnermuseum.org/collection/browse?filter=artist:3157> (accessed June 06, 2017).

A beautiful image of a seated scribe attributed to Gentile Bellini during his stay in Constantinople under Sultan Mehmed II.

Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512) served as the sultan during the beginning decades of the sixteenth century, and unlike his predecessor and immediate successors he was not renowned for his military prowess. Although Bayezid engaged in numerous battles against the Venetians, and even defeated them in 1503 acquiring ports in Morea, including Lepanto, he left eastern Europe largely alone and was therefore not perceived as a true peril to the safety of Latin Christendom.⁵ However, his son, Selim I (r.1512-20), was an able ruler and military commander and his rapid successes in the east were a cause for alarm among the papacy and European rulers. Florentine historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini's *The History of Italy* gives perfect insight into the differing views on the two sultans. Guicciardini (1483-1540), a contemporary and friend of Machiavelli, was a former servant of the Florentine Republic and a principal writer of the sixteenth century.⁶

From 1537 until his death on May 22, 1540 he wrote *The History* which is an Italian narrative that blamed foreigners like the kings of France and Spain for Italy's troubles after the French invasion of 1494.⁷ The text begins with a brief account of 1490 to 1493, and for Guicciardini 1494 was "a most unhappy year for Italy, and in truth the beginning of those years of misfortune, because it opened the door to innumerable calamities, in which, one could say, for various reasons, a great part of the world was subsequently involved."⁸ While this claim is a slight exaggeration, from the European perspective it did appear as though the main political players on the world stage were involved in the affairs of Italy. The French, the Spanish under Ferdinand of Aragon, The Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor, and the Ottomans

⁵ L.W. Cowie, *Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Great Britain: Oliver & Boyd, 1977), 289.

⁶ Thomas J. Dandele, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 74.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 32.

were all involved in some way with Italy during the beginning of the early modern period. Even though the Ottomans made advances against the Venetians in 1503, they were probably the least destructive to the security of the Italian peninsula. Though Guicciardini's tone is generally negative in regards to the Ottoman Turks, his opinion on foreign monarchs like the French kings and the Hapsburg Emperors is just as disapproving due to their constant meddling in Italian affairs.

Guicciardini did not dedicate many pages to the discussion of the Ottomans, but his accounts of sultans Bayezid, Selim, and Süleyman are indicative of the changing perception of the danger that the Ottomans posed to the Europeans. He only mentioned Bayezid a few times in relation to the Ottoman involvement with the Venetians, and even though the sultan was successful at the expense of Venice, Guicciardini's overall assessment of the Turkish ruler is positive. The author recounted the peace arrangements between the Ottomans and the Venetians in his account of the year 1504. Guicciardini referred to Bayezid in his entries for 1494 and 1499, but these are brief references that do not indicate any sort of feeling towards the sultan or the Ottomans. In 1504, Bayezid proved to no longer be a threat to the Italian peninsula and Europe, and Guicciardini's description of the ruler reflects this. He began by noting that both the Ottomans and Venetians "greedily grasped" for peace and attributed this to Bayezid being:

... a prince of mild ways, very unlike his ferocious father, and dedicated to literature and to the study of the sacred books of his religion, was by nature very indisposed to warfare. Therefore, although he had begun the war with the greatest preparations by land and by sea, and in the first two years had captured Naupactus, (today called Lepanto), Modon, Corone and Giunco, in the Morea, nevertheless he had not subsequently followed through the war with the same intensity.⁹

⁹ Ibid., 176.

Not only did Guicciardini note that Bayezid was unlike his father who expanded the Ottoman Empire at the expense of the Christians, but he also portrayed the sultan as an enlightened ruler who was interested in scholarly pursuits and religion. For Guicciardini, it was the European monarchs who ravaged Italy for their own purposes that were responsible for the ailments of the Venetians and the entire Italian peninsula. After his summary of the relationship between the Venetians and the Turks he declared that:

The war against the Turks did not create as much harm to the Venetians as did the fact that the King of Portugal had taken away the spice trade from them, to their great detriment and damage...And since this was one of the most memorable things which happened in the world for many centuries, and since the harm it caused the city of Venice has some connection with Italian affairs, it is not entirely irrelevant to discuss it at some length.¹⁰

Sultan Bayezid may not have been a cause of alarm for Guicciardini and other Europeans, but his son and successor Selim's rapid conquests in the east resulted in alarm especially for the Pope and the French, Spanish, English, and Hapsburg monarchs. It was Selim's victories against the Safavid Shah Isma'il of Persia (r. 1501-24) in 1514, and the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria two years later that paved the way for Süleyman's military successes during his sultanate. Süleyman (r.1520-66) was also able to represent the Ottomans for the first time as the true defenders of Islam on the world stage against Christendom due to Selim's acquisition of the Muslim holy cities, Mecca and Medina. By conquering the Mamluk Empire, Selim became the first Ottoman to take the title of *caliph* and began to actively promote himself as the universal Islamic ruler whose sovereignty reached beyond his borders.¹¹ Selim turned the Ottoman Empire from a marginal Muslim state into the central power of the Islamic world, while also drawing the attention of the Europeans.

¹⁰ Ibid., 179.

¹¹ Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30-31.

Selim was not Bayezid's oldest son, and so he secured his position as ruler in the normal Ottoman fashion by eliminating his brothers and nephews, and even deposed his father in 1512. When Guicciardini reflected on Selim's murderous nature in *The History* he claimed that "it was also universally believed that in order to be completely safe, Selim had had him [Bayezid] wickedly put to death by poison."¹² He went so far as to speculate that Selim was not "content with having killed, according to Ottoman custom, his nephews and any other descendants of that stock, it was believed (so bitter and implacable was his temperament) that he sometimes thought of taking the life of his only son Suleiman."¹³ While it is highly unlikely that Selim actually wanted to assassinate his only successor, this quote demonstrates that the Europeans were alarmed by the new sultan's fratricide and believed his bouts of violence would result in the Ottomans turning their attention back to Europe. Selim's takeover of the sultanate and defeat of the Safavids and Mamluks happened within five years, and Christian Europe firmly believed that he would turn his Ottoman army against them. By 1518 there was a respite in war throughout Italy which had not happened for years:

On the contrary, all the Christian princes seemed to be of the same disposition; and among these, the Pope being the promulgator thereof, plans were being made (with more seeming argumentation rather than substantial recommendations) for a unified expedition of all Christendom against Selim, Prince of the Turks. Selim's power had so grown the previous year that, considering his might and his greed for domination, his skill and ferocity, it might well be suspected that if the Christian powers did not take steps to attack him, he would turn his victorious arms against them before much time passed.¹⁴

Even more significant for Guicciardini and Italy was that there were rumors that "Selim's thoughts were entirely turned toward Italy, and that his idea of attacking it was

¹² Guicciardini, *The History*, 298.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

emboldened by the disagreement amongst the princes and his knowledge of how much Italy had been lacerated by many years of war.”¹⁵ Due to this assessment, with the ascension of Pope Leo X (r. 1513-21) in 1513 there was actual hope for a European crusade against the Turk. Leo became Pope on March 9, 1513 and by September of that year he issued crusade indulgences against the Turks and again in November of 1517.¹⁶ News of Selim’s victory against Shah Isma’il of Persia at Chaldiran in August 1514 reached Rome on October 30, 1514 and caused alarm for the Pope.¹⁷ Leo headed the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-17) where there were several appeals to heed the Eastern danger. On May 4, 1515, the titular archbishop of Patras, Stefano Taleazzi, cautioned that the Turk “like a ferocious dragon moves swiftly forward to devour us.”¹⁸ Therefore, Leo helped establish a “universal truce for five years amongst all the Christian potentates” and “everyone accepted the truce, and everyone declared himself, with ostentatious and magnificent speeches, to be against the Turk and to be ready (if the others concurred) to lend all their strength to so just a cause.”¹⁹ Since Selim did not turn his attention toward Europe, the crusade against the Turks never came to fruition because the rulers of Europe “considered the danger uncertain and very far off” and the:

.... result was that all these negotiations not only did not lead to any hopeful conclusion, but were also dealt with only frivolously and, as it were, ceremoniously. Furthermore, it is natural among mankind that those things which at first seem most terrifying, diminish and cancel themselves out from day to day, so that unless new occurrences supervene to rekindle the terror, in the space of a very short time men convince themselves that they are practically out of danger.²⁰

¹⁵ Ibid., 300.

¹⁶ Housley, *The Later Crusades*, 125.

¹⁷ T.C. Price Zimmerman, *Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 25.

¹⁸ Ibid., 26.

¹⁹ Guicciardini, *The History*, 301.

²⁰ Ibid., 301-302.

The diarist and historian, Marin Sanudo (1466-1536), offers the Venetian perception of the Ottomans and Selim in his fifty-eight volume diary that he kept from 1496 to 1533. It consists of 40,000 pages, and includes official documents, private letters, and first-hand accounts of events. Before he died, he bestowed the manuscript notebook of the diaries to the Venetian government for their use and preservation.²¹ After Selim deposed his father and took the throne, the Venetians renewed their truce with the Turks on October 17, 1513, and both sides agreed not to interfere in the wars of the other as long as attacks were not directed at them.²² Sanudo's diary entry for July 30, 1517 gives insight into why the Christians feared Selim's conquest of the Mamluks, as he commented on the slaughter of "mamluks and golems" and noted that "at present, the Turkish sultan has begun to destroy the Arabs with great cruelty, even little children."²³ In the same entry, Sanudo also included a letter that the captain of the Turkish armada wrote to the Grand Master of the Knight of Rhodes:

"...Now the sword of the Moslems has been delivered into the hands of the lord sultan Selim, lord of the world...but you, you mangy herd dog...if you act against this commandment [to recognize the lordship of the sultan]...if you think that fear will keep us from coming to your herd of pigs and taking it, this devilish thought will bring great harm upon your head...."²⁴

Despite the torrid relations between the Ottomans and Europe, the Venetians had a decent rapport with the Turkish sultan. For the entry of May 16, 1518, Sanudo included a letter from Selim in which he talked about the "love and good peace and friendship that will always exist between us [the Ottomans and Venice]":

²¹Marin Sanudo, *Venice, Città Excelentissima: Selections from the Renaissance Diaries of Marin Sanudo*, ed. Patricia H. Labalme and Laura Sanguineti White (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), xix.

²² *Ibid.*, 178.

²³ *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Sultan Selim sach, son of Sultan Bajesit Chan the Emperor of Emperors (*Imperator Imperatorum*), Emperor by the grace of God, Greatest Emperor of Asia, Europe, Persia, Syria, unconquered Lord of Arabia and Egypt, etc.

Hitherto there was always an oath of good friendship and peace between the Most Serene Doge of Venice and us, and at present the aforesaid Most Serene Doge of Venice, ser Leonardo Loredan, has sent ser Bortolo Contarini and ser Alvis Mocenigo the knight, his worthy gentleman, to my high and glorious court to show the love and royal friendship and ancient peace that existed between us, and to affirm it and work together to improve it. And I swear by God who created heaven and earth...that love and good peace and friendship will always exist between us....²⁵

Selim's letter to the Doge was sincere, and the Venetians and the Ottomans continued their peaceful associations into Süleyman's reign.

While Selim was a very real and dangerous hazard to the Muslim states in the Middle East, he was not an actual menace to western Europe as his son Süleyman would prove to be. There is an obvious shift in tone toward the Ottoman Turk after Süleyman conquered Belgrade in 1521 and Rhodes in 1522. The topic of the Turk was also important to northern European writers like reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) and humanist Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), due to the Ottomans involvement in eastern and central Europe. Luther referred to the Turks abundantly throughout his texts, and even devoted three tracts to the topic, however these writings appear after Süleyman directed his attention toward Europe in 1521. The first time Luther actually referred to the Turks was in *The Ninety-Five Theses* in 1517, and is one of the forty-one that were condemned by the Papal Bull, *Exsurge Domine*, in 1520 as heretical and scandalous. Luther believed that the Turks were a punishment from God for Christian sins, especially the papacy, and proclaimed that to fight the Turks was to resist the judgement of God (*"Proeliari adversus Turcas est repugnare Deo visitanti iniquitates*

²⁵ Ibid.

nostras per illos.”) In the same year, Luther maintained this position in his Latin reply to the Bull of Excommunication and in the German version published in 1521.²⁶

Before Luther’s *Theses*, Erasmus dedicated *The Education of a Christian Prince*, published in May 1516, to the future Emperor Charles V (r. 1519-56). In this year the Ottoman sultan was thoroughly involved in the east, and therefore the Turk was not a direct threat to Europe. Prior to Luther’s call for religious reform and avoidance of war with the Turk, Erasmus urged Prince Charles that he did not believe:

.... that war against the Turks should be hastily undertaken, remembering first of all that the kingdom of Christ was created, spread, and secured by very different means....Indeed, judging by the people who fight this kind of war nowadays, it is more likely that we shall turn into Turks than that our efforts will make them into Christians. Let us first make sure that we are truly Christian ourselves and then, if it seems appropriate let us attack the Turks.²⁷

During the beginning decades of the sixteenth century for men like Erasmus and Luther, Christian reform was more important than an offense against the Ottomans. In 1517 Erasmus reiterated his desire for reform and peace amongst the warring European monarchs in his plea, *A Complaint of Peace*. Erasmus is similar to Guicciardini in his disapproval of the internal fighting between the European princes, and even asked “what land has not been soaked in Christian blood, what river or sea not stained with human gore?”²⁸ During this time, for Europeans in the north and the south, the warring Christian monarchs were more of a cause for worry than the Muslim Turks.

²⁶ Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700* (New York: AMS Press, 1976), 135.

²⁷ Desiderius Erasmus, “The Education of a Christian Prince,” in *The Erasmus Reader*, ed. Erika Rummel (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 286.

²⁸ Erasmus, “A Complaint of Peace,” in *The Erasmus Reader*, ed. Erika Rummel (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 300.

In 1518 in a letter to Paul Volz, Erasmus criticized the crusade ideal by exposing the harshness of prevailing attitudes toward the Turk, and implored what would become of the Turks if Leo X's proposed crusade succeeded. He discussed the Turks from a Christian humanist standpoint and challenged contemporary European notions of holy war and the Infidel.²⁹ In his letter he noted that "if the Turks should observe our ambition because of our loud, tyrannical clamoring, our avarice because of our plundering, our lust because of our debauchery, our cruelty because of our oppressive rule, how shall we press upon them the doctrine of Christ, so contrary to all these things?"³⁰ Like Luther, Erasmus argued that the Christians were a greater danger to their faith than the Turks, and even referred to them as "men, nor are their hearts of iron or steel."³¹ However, by 1529 after Süleyman's first siege of Vienna, both Luther and Erasmus changed their tunes in regard to the Ottoman Turks. The reason for this change is that Süleyman posed an actual threat to Europe in the Mediterranean and in eastern Europe, while Selim never had the time, and possibly even the ambition, to invade Europe. It was Süleyman who awakened the true fears of Turks in Europe.

Even though Europeans feared the Turk, and often wrote derogatorily about the Ottomans, several scholars and travelers writing in the early modern period commended them for various reasons while still referring to them as barbarians. Italian historians and treatise writers Giovanni Menavino, Andrea Cambini, and Paolo Giovio echoed humanist concepts of the Turks as a menace to both Christianity and high culture, while also praising aspects of their empire.³² Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) is another important Italian writer

²⁹ Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 175.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 178.

from the early sixteenth century that gives insight into the European perception of the Turk. Machiavelli saw the Ottomans as a great and impressive empire, and like Guicciardini, he believed that the European monarchs were the reason for Italy's problems. In book four of *The Prince* (1513) Machiavelli compared the Ottoman Empire to France, since the latter was a cause for strife in Italy, his assessment is much more negative than that of the Turks.³³ For Machiavelli, the barbarians were the French who unleashed their "barbarous cruelties and outrages" upon Italy.³⁴ His praise of the Turks reaches its pinnacle in *The Discourses on Livy* (1513-17) in the preface to book two. He contended that the world's *virtu*, which had been centered in Rome for centuries, had been redistributed to other nations including the Turks.³⁵ He believed that "whoever is born in Italy or Greece and has not become either an Ultramontane in Italy or a Turk in Greece has reason to condemn his times and to praise others, since in the latter there are plenty of things to evoke his admiration, whereas in the former he comes across nothing but extreme misery, infamy, and contempt..."³⁶ Despite the general negative view of the Turk throughout European literature in the beginning of the century, Machiavelli is a perfect example of the dual outlook that Europeans had in regard to the Turks. While the Ottomans posed a threat to the safety of Latin Christendom, they also had redeemable qualities which were a topic of discussion for early modern Europeans.

There are not many Ottoman sources available outside of Ottoman Turkish and modern Turkish from the beginning decades of the sixteenth century that reveal the Ottoman perception of the West. There is also no body of evidence on the Ottoman response to the

³³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 15-18.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

³⁵ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 177.

³⁶ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, ed. Bernard Crick (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 267.


discovery of the Americas.³⁷ However, there is a map by Ottoman galley captain, Piri Reis (c. 1465/70-1553), from 1513 which reveals that the Ottomans had interest in and were aware of the European discoveries in the Atlantic (Fig. 3). Reis was the Ottoman's first noteworthy cartographer who made some use of Western sources, and in turn he introduced the Ottomans to the new discoveries in the Atlantic.³⁸ This is an improved copy of Columbus's map from 1498, and is the oldest surviving map of the Americas.³⁹ It was drawn in color on gazelle parchment hide, and depicts the western portion of the world while the remainder has been lost.⁴⁰ In 1517, Piri Reis dedicated his map to Sultan Selim who encouraged him to undertake his book, *Kitab-ı Bahriye (Book of Sea Lore)*, which was a study of the naval conditions of the Mediterranean and was completed in 1521. In 1526, Reis expanded the book by adding a long introductory poem that gave the Ottoman elite their first detailed account of the European discoveries. The bulk of the *Bahriye* is an elaborate guide for the Mediterranean sailor and does not necessarily deal with the European discoveries, but a portion of the introductory poem does.

³⁷ Andrew C. Hess, "Piri Reis and the Ottoman Response to the Voyages of Discovery," *Terrae Incognitae* 6, no. 1 (2013): 19.

³⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 152.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁰ Abbas Hamdani, "The Ottoman Response to the Discovery of America and the New Route to India," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 101, no. 3 (1981): 327.



Dünya Haritası, Piri Reis
 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. No. H. 1824
 The World Map, Piri Reis
 Library of Topkapı Palace Museum. No. H. 1824

Figure 3. Piri Reis, *The World Map*, 1513. Color on gazelle parchment hide, 90 x 65 cm. Library of Topkapı Palace Museum, Istanbul, Turkey. Available from: The Epoch Times, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1165572-piri-reis-map-evidence-of-a-very-advanced-prehistoric-civilization/> (accessed June 06, 2017).

The poem is written in relatively simple Ottoman Turkish and is divided into twenty-three sections. The first eight contain a history of the manuscript, account of nautical problems, introduction to the use of compasses and maps, and descriptions of the world's seas. The last fifteen chapters are important because they recount the history of the fifteenth and sixteenth century European explorations.⁴¹ While Selim was not involved in Europe during his reign, the Europeans, especially the Portuguese, turned their attention toward the Indian Ocean, and their action in this region restricted access to Mecca and Medina for the first time in history.⁴² In his introductory poem, Reis commented on how the Portuguese intruded deep into Muslim territories, and how in 1517 they raided Jidda, the port for Mecca and Medina, and lamented that the Christian penetration into the house of Islam was a matter of shame for the Muslims. Although the Ottomans were relative newcomers in the Indian Ocean, Selim's conquest of the Mamluks by 1517 made him the "Protector of the Holy Cities" and defender of all Islamdom, and this solidified the Ottomans as the most powerful Muslim state.⁴³

Within eight short years, Selim transformed the empire by doubling its size and by making the Ottoman sultan the new leader of the Muslim world. Selim and his army were formidable foes for the fledgling Safavids in Iran and the declining Mamluks in Egypt. The Safavid Empire began as a Turkmen confederation in opposition to the centralized power of the Ottomans led by a Shi'a Sufi sheikh, and they dominated all of Iran by 1510. Two years after deposing his father, Selim crushed the rebel Turks in Anatolia and proceeded to take on the Safavids and their supposedly infallible leader, Shah Isma'il. On August 23, 1514 Selim

⁴¹ Hess, "Piri Reis," 21-23.

⁴² Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, 7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 25 and 30.

defeated Isma'il at the Battle of Chaldiran, which helped secure eastern Anatolia and lessen the severity of the Safavid threat to the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴ Even though the Safavids continued to pose problems for the Ottomans during Süleyman's reign, their overall hazard was diminished and enabled Selim to conquer the Mamluks. Acquisition of the holy cities strengthened the Ottoman claim to be protector of Sunni orthodoxy against the Shi'a heterodoxy of Isma'il.

Selim's victory against the Mamluk Empire was a major turning point for the Ottomans, because now the sultan was the "sovereign chosen by God to protect the whole [true] Islamic world."⁴⁵ Since the late thirteenth century on, the Ottoman tribal chieftains and sultans emphasized their role as *gazi* warriors engaged in Holy War, and the acquisition of Mecca and Medina meant that Selim, and his successors, could legitimately portray themselves as the defenders of the faith. However, even though the Ottomans were now in control of the Holy Cities and declared themselves to be the protectors of Islam, they were not entirely welcome. After the Ottomans took control of Egypt, the Egyptian historian Ibn Zunbul wrote his account of the defeat in the *Wáqciat as-Sultán Selim Khán Maca s-Sultán Túmánbáy*. Little is known about Ibn Zunbul, but the astronomer to the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghuri (r. 1501-16) probably died sometime after 1553. This book is a mixture of "high" and folk literature, historiography, and takes the form of a semi-folk epic.⁴⁶ The text is clearly a

⁴⁴Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010), 44-45.

⁴⁵ André Clot, *Suleiman the Magnificent: The Man, His Life, His Epoch*, trans. Matthew J. Reisz (London: Saqi Books, 1992), 20-21.

⁴⁶ Andrea Moustafa-Hamouzova, "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt 1517 through Egyptian Eyes. Ibn Zunbul's *Wáqciat as-Sultán Selim Khán Maca s-Sultán Túmánbáy*," *Archiv Orientalni* 69 (2001): 190 and 206.

pro-Mamluk work, written when Egypt was already in Ottoman possession, and reflects the general opinion of the Egyptian people and their admiration for the Mamluks.⁴⁷

Overall this text is an apology for the Mamluks, and while the author presented them as good Muslims he proclaimed that the Ottomans were originally Christians who converted to Islam, thus undermining their claim as defenders of the Muslim faith. Even though the characters of the book are traditionally illustrated as good or evil, and Selim is assigned the role of enemy and conqueror, he is not a completely bad character. Per the text, Selim did not want to go to Egypt but was persuaded by the greedy Mamluk emir Khayrbay, the governor of Syrian Aleppo, who wanted to share in the spoils of Egypt. Ibn Zunbul thus relieved Selim of responsibility for the Egyptian campaign, even though the Ottoman sultan was far more interested in wealthy Cairo than in arid Syria. Throughout, Ibn Zunbul depicted Selim as a ruler who was easily influenced and likely to listen to other's advice. For Zunbul the Ottoman's victory was effortless and accidental, due to corruption and plotting within the Mamluk army, and characters like emir Khayrbay were the true villains of his narrative.⁴⁸ Most importantly, Zunbul emphasized the belief that the Ottomans used unfair weapons, and had they not the Mamluks would have beaten them with classical weapons.⁴⁹

According to Zunbul, the Ottomans were dependent on Western technology and to an increasing extent relied on Western renegades and mercenaries to equip and direct their artillery.⁵⁰ His opinion of the conquest is evident in two imaginary conversations between Selim and Sultan Tumanbay II of Cairo (r. 1516-17) and another Mamluk emir named

⁴⁷ Ibid., 206.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 193-194.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 200.

⁵⁰ Bernard Lewis, *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 21.

Kurtbay. In the dialogue between Selim and Tumanbay, the latter accused his enemy of committing an unforgivable crime by using firearms against Muslims, and asserted that the Mamluks fought like lions, in accordance with the Divine Law, with weapons that were approved by the prophet Muhammad. Here Selim is portrayed as a cruel conqueror, but one who was put in the position by men like Khayrbay. In this scene, Selim even apologized for causing conflict and defended himself by saying that he received the *fatwa* from the *ulama* permitting him to enter Egypt.⁵¹ This sentiment is reiterated in a conversation between Selim and the captured emir Kurtbay:

You have patched up an army from all parts of the world: Christians, Greeks, and others, and you have brought with you this contrivance, artfully devised by the Christians of Europe when they were incapable of meeting the Muslim armies on the battlefield. It is this musket, which even if a woman were to fire it, she could hold up so many men. Had we chosen to use this weapon, you would not have preceded us in its use. But we are people who do not discard the *sunna* of our Prophet Muhammad, which is the *jihad* in the path of God, with sword and lance... Woe to you: how can you shoot with firearms against those who testify to the unity of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad?

For centuries the Ottoman rulers presented themselves as ‘fighters of the faith’ whose duty it was to continually advance the frontiers of Islam by submitting their Christian neighbors to their laws.⁵² The early leaders of the Ottoman state had risen from nomad chiefs to lords of an empire mainly through combat with Christians.⁵³ Therefore the Ottoman sultan was considered to be the greatest of the *gazi* warriors, and his responsibility was to constantly advance the frontiers and laws of orthodox Sunni Islam, especially against the Christians.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Moustafa-Hamouzova, “The Ottoman Conquest,” 203.

⁵² Clot, *Suleiman*, 300.

⁵³ Roger Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1944), 38.

⁵⁴ Clot, *Suleiman*, 21.

However, for the Muslims living under the Mamluks, it appeared as though the Ottomans were more Christian than Muslim.

Selim's reign was one of the most formative times in the history of the Ottoman Empire, because his advances in the Middle East enabled the Ottoman sultan to present himself for the first time as the official representative of Islam on the world stage. While it was Selim who transformed the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, it was his son and successor, Süleyman, who inspired true fear throughout western Europe. With the death of Selim on September 22, 1520, the West was incorrectly led to believe that Süleyman was a peaceable ruler and of no threat. At first it appeared that Selim's death had freed Europe from the danger of the Muslim Turks, and that the new sultan was "a meek lamb succeeding a fierce lion."⁵⁵ After the dissipation of a united European crusade under Pope Leo X, Guicciardini noted that Selim left "his great empire to Suleiman, his son, a young man but reputed to be more mild-spirited (although the results demonstrated otherwise) and not disposed to make war."⁵⁶ Since *The History* was written in retrospect, this account reveals just how wrong the Europeans were about the new sultan. Süleyman officially inherited the position on September 30, 1520, and by August 1521 he had successfully captured Belgrade and in December 1522 expelled the Hospitallers from the island of Rhodes.⁵⁷ After Süleyman's first military victory in 1521, the European attitude towards the Turks began to harden. Unlike Selim, his successor showed from the beginning of his reign that western

⁵⁵ Vaughan, *The Ottoman Empire*, 106.

⁵⁶ Guicciardini, *The History*, 302.

⁵⁷ Housley, *The Later Crusades*, 127.

expansion and the fight against the Infidel was just as important as the struggle against the heretical Safavids in the east.⁵⁸

Süleyman's victories against Belgrade and Rhodes were vital on strategic and religious levels, because Süleyman was able to establish himself as a *gazi* and as the figurehead of Islamdom early on in his career, and both locations were helpful for future attacks on Europe. By taking Belgrade, the sultan had taken the "outer wall of Christendom," and this resulted in the Ottomans occupying land uncomfortably close to the Germanies.⁵⁹ While his victory at Rhodes secured the island for Muslim traders, resulted in Ottoman supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, and gave the Ottomans a strategic base to attack Italy and Spain. These early conquests resulted in widespread fear throughout Europe, and is evidenced in the propaganda, literature, and art that Europeans produced throughout his reign. Diarist Marin Sanudo included a summary of the report from Venice's former ambassador to the sultan, Marco Minio, in his entry for April 8, 1522. Minio actually spent time in the Ottoman Empire under the new sultan, and his account described Süleyman's resources, households, navy, and his temperament. According to Minio:

This sultan is a perfect Turk and very observant of his own law, he is the enemy of the Christians and the Jews and mistreats the Jews in his territories, which did not happen in the days of Selim, his father. This is a person who informs himself, who does not like to be told what to do but who instead forms opinions that he clings to stubbornly. I do not believe that he will be a peaceful person, but will soon show that he is most warlike. Now that he has taken Belgrade, he thinks that he holds the keys to Christendom in his hands.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid., 126.

⁵⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 2, *The Sixteenth Century to the Reign of Julius III*, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society v. 161 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 199.

⁶⁰ Sanudo, *Venice, Città Excelentissima*, 209.

Süleyman's victory at Belgrade gave the Ottomans a foothold in central Europe and imbedded them in Hungarian politics throughout his entire reign. His involvement in Hungary and Rhodes resulted in the Ottomans coming face to face with the Hapsburgs in the Holy Roman Empire and the Mediterranean.

Guicciardini briefly mentioned the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes, recalling that “the most unhappy event at the end of the year 1522 was the capture of the island of Rhodes, to the greatest infamy of Christian princes, by Suleiman Ottoman.”⁶¹ Even though the Knights of Rhodes sometimes pillaged Christian vessels in the Mediterranean, they were ultimately “a bulwark of the Christian religion in those seas,” and the loss of the island to Muslims was an affront to all of Christendom.⁶² For Latin Christians like Guicciardini it did not help that:

Suleiman, for the greater contempt of the Christian religion, made his entrance into that city on the birthday of the Son of God; on which day, celebrated with endless songs and music in Christian churches, he had all the churches of Rhodes, dedicated to the cult of Christ, converted into mosques dedicated to the Mohammedan religion, and according to their custom all Christian rites exterminated.⁶³

The Ottomans occupying Belgrade was a cause for alarm throughout all of Europe, and this fear was especially evident throughout the Germanies. The dread of a possible Turkish advance into German lands was expressed throughout a series of printed pamphlets from 1522 to 1543, known as the *Türkenbüchlein*. These expressed the reactions of the German people to the invasions of Hungary and Austria by Süleyman, and contain a great deal of anti-Turkish propaganda. Various authors like Martin Luther, Andreas Osiander, Justus Jonas, and lesser figures regarded the Turks as the aggressive representatives of the world of Islam, and believed that they were a scourge inflicted upon Christendom by an

⁶¹ Guicciardini, *The History*, 334

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 335.

angry God. Therefore these tracts are a mirror of the thought and feeling of sixteenth century Germans towards the sultan and the Turk.⁶⁴ They also demonstrate the evolving perception of the Turk as Süleyman continued to advance further into Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire throughout his reign.

The first *Türkenbüch* appeared in the spring of 1522, a few months after the fall of Belgrade. This anonymous pamphlet, originally titled *Turken biechlin*, discussed the Turkish threat to Central Europe and Christendom in the form of a dialogue. It takes place outside the walls of Belgrade after the siege and features a Turkish spy (the villain), his assistant, a gypsy, a Hungarian worried about the future of his country, and a Catholic hermit (the hero) who is very concerned about the Turkish threat to all of Christendom. The Turk is confident that Süleyman will continue to make more conquests, and boasted of the sultan's power which he attributed to the civil and military virtues of the Turks and their unity under the absolute authority of the sultan. He continued by belittling the Christians for fighting against one another and for their lack of unity against the Ottomans.⁶⁵

Even though European literature from the sixteenth century reflects the negative perceptions that Europeans had of the Turks, it also reveals the aspects of the Ottoman Empire that Western writers commended, like the unity of the Empire under one sultan. Authors like Guicciardini in Florence, Sanudo in Venice, Erasmus in the Netherlands, and Luther in the Germanies all lamented the internecine fighting between the rulers of Christendom that characterized the sixteenth century, and it is a common trope throughout literature from this time. Therefore, the hero of the *Turken biechlin* admitted that the

⁶⁴ John W. Bohnstedt: "The Infidel Scourge of God: The Turkish Menace as Seen by German Pamphleteers of the Reformation Era," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 58, no. 9 (1968): 1.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

Christians and their rulers have their shortcomings, and noted that it would not be easy to fight the Turks since the Christians have provoked God with their sins. While God allowed the Turk to become powerful enough to punish the Christians, the hermit branded the sultan a tyrant who must be stopped. The author's main argument emphasized that the Christians must desist from sin and correct their affairs before they could free themselves from the Turk. After this pamphlet appeared, it became a best seller and its themes reoccurred in other tracts as these ideas were typical of the age.⁶⁶

After taking Belgrade in 1521, Süleyman turned his attention to the Mediterranean and did not resume his offensive on the Danube until four years later in 1526. The sultan was again victorious at the Battle of Mohacs and destroyed the political independence of the Magyar kingdom. The young King Louis II of Hungary (r. 1516-26) lost his life in this battle, and the dynasty of the Jagellions died with him. This resulted in one faction of the Magyar nobility electing the Hapsburg emperor-elect Ferdinand (r. 1521-64), while the other chose King John Zápolya of Transylvania (r.1526-40). Zápolya applied to the Porte for Turkish aide, and in turn Süleyman hoped to use him as a puppet ruler. The alliance concluded between the two in 1528, and Süleyman recognized Zápolya as King of Hungary in return for vassalage and tribute.⁶⁷ Shortly after the sultan's third European victory, an anonymous and undated *Türkenbüch* appeared, *Excerpt from a Letter Written by a Resident of Turkey to His Friend in These [German] Lands*. This tract was widely read and designed to warn the Germans that the Turk could be efficient and powerful, therefore Christians should be on their guard. The author urged the Germans to stop their factional quarrels and recommended

⁶⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 6-7.

vigilance rather than immediate action.⁶⁸ However, the Turkish threat faded into the background as Süleyman withdrew from his affront on Europe for a few years, and the subjects of the Holy Roman Empire were embroiled in the Reformation.

Luther did not issue a detailed report of his views on the Turkish problem until the winter of 1528-9 when he wrote *On the War against the Turks (Vom Kriege wider die Turken)*. In late 1526 at the end of a pamphlet debating *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligen Stande sein können)*, he claimed it was useless to write on the Turkish war, since the sultan returned home and the Germans lost interest.⁶⁹ In 1528 as the Turkish danger again made itself apparent, Luther related his opinion on the topic which reiterated similar themes found throughout the *Türkenbüchlein*. He began by drawing attention to his original statement that was condemned by the papacy “To fight the Turk is the same as resisting God, who visits our sin upon us with this rod.”⁷⁰ He argued that:

The popes had never seriously intended to wage war against the Turk; instead they used the Turkish war as a cover for their game and robbed Germany of money by means of indulgences whenever they took the notion. The whole world knew it, but now it is forgotten. So they condemned my article because it opposed the Turkish war, but because it tore away this cloak and blocked the path along which the money went to Rome....If there had been a general opinion that serious war was at hand, I could have polished my article somewhat more and made some distinctions....But what motivated me most of all was this: They undertook to fight against the Turk in the name of Christ, and taught and incited men to do this, as though our people were an army of Christians against the Turks, who were enemies of Christ. This is absolutely contrary to Christ’s doctrine and name...It is against his name because there are scarcely five Christians in such an army, and perhaps there are worse people in the eyes of God in that army than are the Turks; and yet they all want to bear the name of Christ.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁹ Vaughan, *The Ottoman Empire*, 136-137.

⁷⁰ Martin Luther, “On War against the Turk,” in *Luther Selected Political Writings*, ed. J.M. Porter (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974, 121.

⁷¹ Ibid., 123-124.

Immediately, Luther decided to set the record straight on his controversial opinion by making clear the reasons why he had objected in the first place. Like other authors of the *Türkenbüchlein* he viewed the Turks as a punishment from God, and in order to wage a war against them he declared that the “fight must be begun with repentance, and we must reform our lives or we shall fight in vain...”⁷² He also shared the belief that after Christians began to amend their ways, “they should then be most diligently exhorted to prayer and shown that such prayer pleases God...”⁷³ For Luther it was imperative that kings and the German princes take Süleyman and his army seriously because “the Turk is a mighty lord that no kingdom or land, whatever it is, is strong enough to resist him alone, unless God performs a miracle.”⁷⁴ If war was to be undertaken against the Turks, then “it should be fought at the emperor’s command, under his banner, and in his name.”⁷⁵ While Charles V and the Catholics emphasized the role of the Holy Roman Emperor as that of defender of the faith, Luther and his followers disagreed, instead they believed Charles should lead the fight as a secular figurehead. This booklet appeared around ten days before Süleyman’s first siege of Vienna, and Luther began to work on and finish his second tract during the siege in the autumn of 1529.⁷⁶

It was widely believed at this time that Süleyman was going to lead a great invasion of Germany, and the siege of Vienna was just the first step, therefore Luther enclosed proposals for action in his *Army Sermon against the Turks (Heerpredigt wider den Turken)*. While the *Heerpredigt* contained various points that Luther made in *Vom Kriege*, he also

⁷² Ibid., 126.

⁷³ Ibid., 127.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 129.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 130.

⁷⁶ Vaughan, *The Ottoman Empire*, 137.

recommended the need for reform and prayer by all classes, laying waste to the land should the Turks succeed, and if taken into captivity the memorization and teaching of the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Creed.⁷⁷ Even though Luther still considered the Turks to be a punishment from God, Süleyman's display of magnificence and power during his siege demonstrated to the Europeans, especially the Germans, how strong and legitimate of a foe he truly was. At the time, it appeared that Süleyman was truly capable of taking the Germanies, and the possibility of the Muslims laying waste to the Holy Roman Empire appeared to be a real and immediate threat.

Although Süleyman and his army abandoned the siege of Vienna on October 14, 1529, there existed an atmosphere of uneasy anticipation throughout Europe for months after the sultan returned to Istanbul. Within this panicked environment Erasmus wrote his own *On the War against the Turk (De bello turcico)* on the eve of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530.⁷⁸ This treatise echoed the sentiments of the *Türkenbüchlein* and even Luther's *Vom Kriege* in that Erasmus also urged the Christian rulers to stop fighting each other, and believed that the Turkish advance was a result of Christian sins. He contended that "we have been endlessly fighting among ourselves over some useless plot of ground in what are worse than civil wars, the Turks have vastly extended their empire or, rather, their reign of terror," and that they "owe their victories to our sins; we have opposed them but, as the results plainly show, God has been angered against us. We assail the Turks with the selfsame eagerness with which they invade the lands of others."⁷⁹ Erasmus argued that "however cruel the deeds of the

⁷⁷ Ibid., 137-138.

⁷⁸ Erasmus, "On the War against the Turks," 315.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 317.

Turks, the same deeds committed against his fellow by a Christian are still more cruel.”⁸⁰ For sixteenth century humanists and reformers the state of Christendom was compromised due to violence against one another, and because of this God had allowed Süleyman and his Muslim army to successfully invade Europe.

Erasmus continued by commenting on Luther’s original belief that “it is not lawful to resist the Turks, because God is punishing the sins of his people through them,” by concluding that war was acceptable, unless God expressly prohibits it.⁸¹ Even though Erasmus asserted that it was acceptable to pick up arms against the Ottomans, he also emphasized that the “mass of Christians are wrong, on the other hand, in thinking that anyone is allowed to kill a Turk, as one would a mad dog, for no better reason than that he is a Turk.”⁸² As a humanist and pacifist Erasmus did not condone the slaughter of Christians or Turks for the mere sake of it, and believed that war must be undertaken with legitimate reason.⁸³ Therefore, according to Erasmus if the Europeans were to make war against the Turk it would have to be for legitimate reasons and under the leadership of the Holy Roman Emperor and secular rulers, since he shared Luther’s objection to clerical leadership in war. While Catholics tended to present the war against the Turk as a holy war, Protestants were inclined to see the struggle as mostly secular and argued against papal intervention.⁸⁴

The German pamphleteers of the *Türkenbüchlein* regarded the Turk as the “hereditary foe” (*erbfeind*) of Christendom, and in the vocabulary of these authors the word Turk was

⁸⁰ Ibid., 318,

⁸¹ Ibid., 320.

⁸² Ibid., 321.

⁸³ Ibid., 317.

⁸⁴ Bohnstedt, “The Infidel Scourge of God,” 14.

synonymous with Mahometan or Moslem.⁸⁵ As the sultan of the Ottomans, it was Süleyman who was the embodiment of the Turk and the Muslim, as he was the representative of Islam on the world stage. A perfect example of this is the image on the title page of Johannes Haselberg's tract from 1530, *Des Türckische[n] Kayzers Heerzug, wie er von Constantinopel Mit aller rüstung, zü Roß und Füß, zü wasser vnd Land* (Fig. 4.).⁸⁶ This print illustrates Süleyman and Emperor Charles V at the head of their armies, since there were "prophecies" that Charles was meant to fill the role of the leader against Süleyman and the Turks, and these beliefs circulated widely throughout the Germanies in pamphlets and folk songs.⁸⁷ It was generally believed by sixteenth century Europeans and Ottomans that these men would represent their religions in the ultimate clash of the faiths. Therefore the caption above the Emperor identifies him as "Carolus, Roman Emperor, Archduke of Austria, etc.—protector of Christendom" and "Sultan Suleiman, Turkish emperor—a hereditary enemy of the Christian faith."⁸⁸ Now that the Ottoman sultan held the position of Caliph of the Muslim world, he represented Islam on a global scale for the first time.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 19.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 37.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 19.




Figure 4. Johann Haselberg, *Emperor Charles V, "protector of Christendom," and Sultan Suleiman, "hereditary enemy of the Christian faith,"* 1530. (Johann Haselberg, *Des Türckische[n] Kaysers Heerzug* [Nuremberg, 1530]. Austrian National Library.) From: John W. Bohnstedt: "The Infidel Scourge of God: The Turkish Menace as Seen by German Pamphleteers of the Reformation Era," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 58, no. 9 (1968): 19.

The frontispiece to Johann Haselberg's *Des Türckische[n] Kaysers Heerzug*.

While the early Ottomans had emphasized their role as *gazis* in their fight against the Christians, the battles and conquests tended to be on the fringe of western Europe, therefore in the Middle Ages the Ottomans were never a true threat to the heart of Latin Christendom. Selim's conquests against the Safavids and the Mamluks in the beginning of the sixteenth century not only secured the position of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, but also helped enable Süleyman to turn his attention to the west and lead his offense into Europe as he hacked into the frontiers of Christendom. Although the European perception of the Turk remained negative after the sultanate of Mehmed the Conqueror, it was during the beginning of the early modern period that this view truly began to harden. When European authors did commend the Ottomans, it was usually to draw attention to the deficits of the Christians and to instigate reform. However, even though the Ottomans and the Europeans considered one another to be infidels and enemies of the faith, their relationship depended just as much on diplomacy as it did war.

Chapter 2: Charles and Süleyman and Universal Sovereignty

The ascension of Süleyman to the Ottoman sultanate on September 30, 1520, marked the beginning of a new generation of rulers in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Süleyman and the European monarchs Henry VIII of England (r. 1509-47), Francis I of France (r. 1515-47), and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V were the first generation of early modern rulers. Even though these men were heavily indebted to medieval ideals and traditions throughout their lives, they helped usher Europe and the Ottoman Empire into the early modern period. While all four of these sovereigns played significant roles and battled one another, it was Süleyman and Charles who represented their nations and religions on the world stage. These two men took their religious positions seriously, and believed it was their duty to lead the struggle between Christians and Muslims. However, the fight between Charles and Süleyman was not simply one of religion, it was also a contest for territory and universal sovereignty.

Throughout Charles's reign he had two serious enemies, one internal and the other external. Within Europe, Charles's biggest rival was the French King Francis I, and these two men warred with one another over dynastic and territorial property. Charles inherited the rivalry with the French king from his Spanish and Hapsburg grandfathers, Ferdinand of Aragon and Emperor Maximilian I. In order to prevent the French from gaining more land, Mary of Burgundy married Maximilian Hapsburg, thus linking central Europe with the Netherlands.⁸⁹ In turn they arranged for their son Philip to marry Juana of Castile and

⁸⁹ Glenn Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy: The Reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I, and Charles V* (Great Britain: Arnold, 2002), 16. The reigns of the monarchs are: Ferdinand of Aragon (r. 1479-1516), Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1493-1519), and Mary of Burgundy (r. 1477-82).

Aragon.⁹⁰ Ferdinand also married his daughter Catherine of Aragon to Prince Arthur of Wales; however, when Arthur died in 1502, Ferdinand secured her marriage to Arthur's younger brother, Henry VIII, in 1509.⁹¹ In doing this Ferdinand's main goals were to preserve Aragonese possessions in Italy, and to prevent any further expansion of French power. Not only did Charles inherit the Burgundian and Hapsburg lands from his paternal grandparents, but due to the dynastic marriages between the children of the Catholic Monarchs and the Hapsburgs, and a series of unfortunate deaths, Charles became the king of Aragon and Castile and that kingdom's Atlantic possessions. This inheritance and his election to the position of Holy Roman Emperor in 1520 made Charles ruler over the largest empire of the age, and gave him hegemony over most of Europe.

Charles's primary driving factor for war was often to maintain his hereditary territories, and in doing so he mostly came into conflict with Francis. There was a web of claims and counter-claims between Charles and Francis that included the Netherlands and Burgundy, the kingdom of Navarre connecting Castile and Aragon, Naples, and Milan. Burgundy and Milan were at the heart of the conflict between Charles and Francis.⁹² The duchy of Milan was the chief prize in contention between the Hapsburgs and France, because each one believed that Milan was his birthright.⁹³ Although the rulers of the Netherlands and Belgium called themselves the Dukes of Burgundy, the French had seized the province of

⁹⁰ Geoffrey Parker, "The Political World of Charles V," in *Charles V and His Time: 1500-1558*, ed. Hugo Soly and Wim Blockmans (Antwerp: Mercatorfonds, 1999), 222. The reigns of the monarchs are: Philip I "the Handsome" (r. 1482-1506) and Juana of Castile and Aragon (r. 1504-55).

⁹¹ Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 6. Catherine of Aragon (r. 1509-33) and Prince Arthur of Wales (d. 1502).

⁹² See Harald Kleinschmidt, *Charles V: The World Emperor* (Stroud, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 2004), 75; Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 49.

⁹³ James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.

Burgundy and the ancestral lands of the Burgundian dukes in 1477.⁹⁴ Throughout the numerous peace negotiations that took place between Francis and Charles regarding Milan, the possession of Burgundy played a key role in either making or breaking the truce.

Charles was under the influence of his Francophile adviser, Guillaume de Croÿ, Lord of Chièvres from 1508 until 1521.⁹⁵ Chièvres was concerned with containing the French while not openly contesting them. Therefore on March 24, 1515, he secured the Treaty of Paris with Francis on Charles's behalf, which temporarily pacified the dispute over the boundaries in Italy and allowed Francis to pursue Milan.⁹⁶ Francis's first major battle and victory took place on September 13 and 14, 1515 at Marignano against the Sforza duke, and it greatly enhanced his prestige and honor as a warrior-king. In the Treaty of Noyon of 1516, Charles officially renounced his claim to Milan.⁹⁷ There was peace between Charles and Francis until 1519 when Emperor Maximilian I died, and Charles, Francis, and Henry vied for the position of Holy Roman Emperor. In *The History of Italy*, Guicciardini noted that originally Maximilian wanted the role of emperor:

...conferred upon his grandchild Ferdinand, for it seemed proper that since so many states and so much power had been lavished on the older brother, the other should be bolstered by this position...nevertheless, urged to the contrary by many of his courtiers and by the Cardinal Sedunense, and by all those who feared and hated the power of the French, his first recommendation was rejected, and he turned his mind to see to it that this dignity should be assumed by the King of Spain. Those who counseled the Emperor proved that it would be much more useful for the exaltation of the house of Austria to concentrate all that power in a single person, than to divide it in several parts, which would make them less capable of carrying out their designs.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Stewart MacDonald, *Charles V: Ruler, Dynast, and Defender of the Faith, 1500-58* (Access to History) (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 3.

⁹⁵ Richard Bonney, *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660*, The Short Oxford History of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 115.

⁹⁶ Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 79.

⁹⁷ H.G. Koenigsberger and George L. Mosse, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, General History of Europe (London: Longmans, 1968), 180; MacDonald, *Charles V*, 66.

⁹⁸ Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 305.

Ultimately, Charles was elected over Francis, which strained their relationship and hampered Francis's attempts to contain Charles's power and authority.⁹⁹

Italy, specifically Milan, became strategically important to Charles in 1521 when Chièvres died and was replaced with the imperialist-minded Mercurino Arborio de Gattinara. As a student of Dante, Gattinara believed that the key to the domination of Christendom lay in Italy and that it would serve as the seat of empire. He advocated the Dantesque vision of a jurist-emperor, who would reassert justice and be the guardian and expositor of Roman law.¹⁰⁰ In 1519, Gattinara told a young Charles that "God has been merciful to you. He has raised you above all the kings and princes in Christendom to a power such as no sovereign has enjoyed since your ancestor Charlemagne. He has set you on the path towards a world monarchy, towards uniting Christendom under a single shepherd."¹⁰¹ The humanist ideal of a united Christendom remained a key goal throughout Charles's lifetime, even though he claimed several times that he had no desire to obtain a global monarchy.

By tradition the Holy Roman Emperor was the figurehead of Christendom, and Charles took the religious ideological commitment of his imperial title seriously.¹⁰² Immediately, Charles began to emphasize his role as the leader in the fight against the Turks and Islam. Süleyman was also considered a defender of his faith and descended from a long line of Ottoman *gazi* warriors. From the late thirteenth century on, the Ottoman tribal chieftains advanced the frontier struggle to the level of *gazi* ideology, thus these fighters on

⁹⁹ Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 80.

¹⁰⁰ John M. Headley, "Rhetoric and Reality: Messianic, Humanist, and Civilian Themes in the Imperial Ethos of Gattinara," in *Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period: Essays*, ed. Marjorie Reeves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 242.

¹⁰¹ Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe*, 214.

¹⁰² Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 127.

the marches were no longer engaged in raiding but in holy war.¹⁰³ However, Süleyman was the first Ottoman sultan that could legitimately present himself as the true protector of Islam due to Selim's conquest of the Mamluk Empire in Egypt. Now that Süleyman held the title of "Servant of the Two Sanctuaries" the Ottoman sultan was the key figure in the holy war against Christendom.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, in both Islamic and Christian lands there were prophecies that a single ruler would be sovereign over the entire world, therefore the struggle between Islam and Christianity was projected onto a global stage headed by Charles and Süleyman.¹⁰⁴ Throughout western Europe and the Ottoman empire existed millenarian prophecies and apocalyptic expectations of the coming of a universal monarch, who was presented as the "Last World Emperor."¹⁰⁵ Within Europe, this prediction was ultimately influenced by the Calabrian abbot, Joachim of Fiore, in the twelfth century. As the Joachimist outlook developed throughout the later Middle Ages, it emphasized the idea of a monarch of the entire world who would be a second Charlemagne, would renew the church, rebuke its ministers, and conquer the Turk.¹⁰⁶ Under this ruler all non-Christians would be converted, and following his reign would be the "millennium," a thousand-year reign of Christ, and the Last Judgment.

In 1488, the astrologer-prophet Johann Lichtenberger foreshadowed the coming of a Burgundian world emperor who would rise to be the ruler of all Europe so that he could

¹⁰³ This view, however, is debated by some scholars like Rudi Paul Lindner, who believes that the *gazi* tradition was not synonymous with *jihad* in the beginning of Ottoman history.

¹⁰⁴ Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*, 26-27.

¹⁰⁵ Gábor Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 97.

¹⁰⁶ Headley, "Rhetoric and Reality," 242.

reform the church and clergy in his *Prognosticatio*.¹⁰⁷ Based on predictions like this, Gattinara and Charles's propagandists portrayed him as the future re-conqueror of Jerusalem as early as 1515, and by 1519-20 Charles's titulature referred to him as the "King of Spain, Sicily, Jerusalem, the Balearic Islands, Hungary, Dalmatia, Croatia and the Indies." Charles actually had no claim to Jerusalem, as it was under Süleyman's control, and this was another point of contention between the two sovereigns.¹⁰⁸

From an early date key members of Charles's entourage, like Gattinara, promoted the idea that he was designated by God to be *imperator mundi*. Throughout Gattinara's time as Grand Chancellor (1520-1530) he greatly influenced Charles, and was the chief protagonist of the idea of world empire. The imperialistic minded Gattinara impressed upon Charles that the key to the domination of Christendom lay in Italy and the fight against the Turk. Even though Charles disclaimed his desire to obtain *monarchia* in his mature years and in his abdication speech in 1556, his ambitions and actions as a young man under the influence of Gattinara proved otherwise.

I had no inordinate ambition to rule a multitude of kingdoms, but merely sought to secure the welfare of Germany, to provide for the defense of Flanders, to consecrate my forces to the safety of Christianity against the Turks and to labor for the extension of the Christian religion...In order that I might not be wanting in my duty I risked my strength, my repose and my life for the safety of Christianity and the defense of my subjects..."¹⁰⁹

After Gattinara died so did Charles's dream of universal sovereignty, especially in regard to the struggle against Süleyman. Even though Charles continued to fight against Süleyman

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 242-243.

¹⁰⁸ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology," 97.

¹⁰⁹ Charles V, "Abdication Speech, Brussels (1556)," in *The European Reformations Sourcebook*, ed. Carter Lindberg (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000), 161-162.

after 1530, his campaigns against the Turk were in the defense of his own interests and territories, and were couched in the rhetoric of holy war and crusade.

Like Charles and his Grand Chancellor, Süleyman was equally influenced by his boyhood friend and Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa (r. 1526-36). İbrahim was outraged by Charles's claims to universal sovereignty and contended that there could only be one emperor in the world, the Ottoman sultan.¹¹⁰ In the minds of Europeans it appeared that Charles was set up for global domination, and in the world of theory and rhetoric he and his advisers portrayed himself as the ruler who would be successful in not only stopping the Turk but in uniting Christendom. Guicciardini commented on these hopes for Charles as early as 1518:

And they argued that Charles' greatness resting upon such mighty foundations, one might hope that, having achieved the imperial crown, he would perforce reduce all of Italy and a great part of Christendom into a single monarchy: a state of affairs which not only would redound to the greatness of his descendants, but also to the peace of his subjects, and with respect to the infidels, to the benefit of all Christendom.¹¹¹

However, in reality Charles was never capable of fulfilling these extravagant claims, because he was not a true emperor and his *monarchia* was made up of various hereditary territories that had nothing in common other than a sovereign. Charles's title as Holy Roman Emperor was just that, a title, and throughout his reign while he took the title seriously his role was completely undermined by the growing power of German princes and the Protestant Reformation. Machiavelli's assessment of the Holy Roman Emperor in the *Discourses on Livy* was correct in that he was a "shadow of an emperor" who exercised "no direct

¹¹⁰ Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *The Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (1989): 411.

¹¹¹ Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, 305.

power.”¹¹² Based on power, authority, resources, and military prowess it was Süleyman, not Charles, who was closer to the sixteenth century ideal of a universal sovereign.

Even though Süleyman exerted an absolute authority that was not witnessed in Europe until the seventeenth century, he was similar to Charles in that he allowed his advisers to influence his decisions and actions. While Süleyman’s reign is generally considered to be the “Golden Age” of the Ottoman Empire, his sultanate marked the beginning of the period in which the influence of grand viziers, advisers, and members of the royal household rose significantly.¹¹³ The Sultan was especially influenced during the thirteen years that İbrahim was grand vizier, and throughout this time the Ottoman Empire experienced an increase in spending and patronage of European art. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire was a society not interested in change, but in preservation of the existing order, İbrahim ensured that Süleyman utilized European symbols of power to assert his own universal sovereignty.¹¹⁴

İbrahim was originally born a subject of the Republic of Venice in the town of Parga, and throughout his time as grand vizier he continued to keep a close relationship and patronage with the Venetians (Fig. 5). At age six, he was taken captive by pirates who sold him as a slave into an elite Ottoman household, and met Süleyman when they were in their teens. When Süleyman became sultan, İbrahim followed him to Istanbul and they were so inseparable that the Venetian *bailo* Pietro Bragadin referred to him as “the heart and breath

¹¹² Thomas J. Dandeleit, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 10.

¹¹³ Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34.

¹¹⁴ Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, Late Byzantine and Ottoman Studies (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989), 46.

of the Sultan.”¹¹⁵ Süleyman continuously advanced his friend’s career until 1523 when he replaced his father’s old grand vizier, Piri Mehmed, with İbrahim. İbrahim’s role as grand vizier and governor-general of Rumeli made him the second highest official in the Ottoman Empire along with being the titular head of the Ottoman civil and military administration.¹¹⁶ As soon as İbrahim took office he began to present the Ottoman sultan as the true emperor of the age, and immediately sought to counter the claims of the Hapsburg monarch and his Grand Chancellor.

¹¹⁵ Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, 34.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.



Figure 5. Sebald Beham, *Sendbrief so Imbraym Wascha*, 1529, hand-colored woodcut, 310 x 195 mm. The British Museum, London. From: The British Museum Online, http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1418635&partId=1&searchText=hand+beham&page=2 (accessed June 06, 2017).

This image comes from a broadside on the Turkish siege of Vienna, with a hand-colored woodcut by Sebald Beham depicting Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa on horseback, including a letterpress letter above from the Vizier, printed in Nuremberg, Germany.

Prophecies of a universal ruler were also significant throughout the Ottoman Empire during Süleyman's reign.¹¹⁷ Soon after he ascended the throne, books of prophecy began to appear. The *Gurbetnâme (Tale of Exile)*, most likely written in the early 1520s by a member of Süleyman's retinue, is an account of the brother of Bayezid II, Cem Sultan's captivity in Christendom between 1483 until his death in 1495. According to the author:

However, the late [prince] had acquired from a Venetian scholar a book of history; there it was written that after the year 920 [1514] one named Sultan Süleyman, of the House of Osman, would become emperor [*padişah*]. In his first campaigns for the Faith [gaza] he would attack Hungary and, after many battles and conquests would attempt several times, without success, to mount sea-campaigns [against Rome]. Thereafter he would create a fleet that none could resist, and wherever he intended conquest he would be victorious. This sultan of the *gazis* and warriors for the faith, Sultan Süleyman Han (God glorify his helpers!), would himself come to Rome, conquer it, and kill countless of its commanders and learned, including the pope of the time. The Emperor, refuge of the world (may he not cease to be bound to God's protection), that is, Sultan Süleyman -Shah, would water and feed his horse in the founts of their churches [St. Peter's], annex Rome to the rest of his domains, and remain there for some time dispensing justice; thus had they written in their books eight hundred years before the year 894 [1489, the date of Cem's arrival in Rome]. When the late prince recounted this great thing, they [i.e., the assembled papal retinue] seemed to have [the book] as well; they fetched the very same book, and on comparison they found the same account with yet more detail.¹¹⁸

At this time predictions influenced public opinion and were utilized by those who created the sultan's image, specifically İbrahim and his close friend Lodovico Gritti, the illegitimate son of the doge of Venice who advised the Ottomans on affairs related to the Hapsburgs and Hungary. Diarist Marin Sanudo noted in his diary that the new grand vizier told the Venetian *bailo* on the eve of the campaign to Mohacs in March 1526 that:

¹¹⁷ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy," 99.

¹¹⁸ İsmail Hami Danişmend as "Gurbet-name-i Sultan Cem ibini Sultan Muhammed," in *Fatih ve İstanbul* II/12 (1954): 227-228, quoted in Cornell H. Fleischer, "Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s Istanbul," in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*, ed. Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 52-53.

The Sultan and he [İbrahim], as youths, had seen an old book in which it was written that he [i.e., Süleyman] would leave the Harem [to take the throne], one who had never had high office would be made first vizier and *beylerbeyi* of Greece [Rumeli] and would be named İbrahim. Then the Ottoman lord, and his [İbrahim's] time, would do many things which his ancestors had never been able to do: To take the Roman Empire, and give battle to the Christians in great campaigns. He would assault the Christians, and wage three great battles, from which the Turkish lord would twice emerge vanquished; but in the third attempt he would take the Roman Empire and all its noble captains and would be victorious; it would be a great victory, by grace of God. He [the sultan] would liberate [the Empire] and all others, and there would be but one religion, in peace and mutual love, and he believes that this must certainly come about.¹¹⁹

İbrahim believed that Süleyman was the new world conqueror, and helped to portray him as the successor of Alexander the Great and Caesar.¹²⁰ Like the Europeans, the Ottomans relied on the rhetoric and imagery of classic Greece and Rome as a means to exert their authority and to legitimate their claims. Charles and Süleyman ruled over an unprecedented amount of land which had not been seen since the time of Alexander, and from the period of 1520 to 1530 it actually seemed as though one of them could successfully suppress the ambitions of the other. After Gattinara died, so did Charles's perceived role as universal emperor, although Charles and his propagandists continued to emphasize his role as the paladin of Christendom in the fight against the Muslim Turks. The Ottoman projection of Süleyman as the "Last World Emperor" also died along with İbrahim in 1536. Even though the idea of universal sovereignty fell dormant with their advisers, Charles and Süleyman continued to battle against each other and counter act one another's assertions throughout their reigns.

Due to İbrahim's influence, Süleyman's reign witnessed the formation of an Ottoman grand strategy to counteract that of the Hapsburgs. Both strategies involved the creation of an

¹¹⁹ Marin Sanudo, *I Diarii*, (Venice, 1879-98), 58 vols., v. 41 (1526), 95, quoted in Fleischer, "Shadows of Shadows," 55.

¹²⁰ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy," 99.

imperial ideology and universalist vision of empire, along with the collection of information within and outside the empires. The gathering of material on happenings of Europe and its monarchs helped keep the sultan and the grand vizier abreast of European politics and culture, which helped integrate the Ottomans into the events of sixteenth century Europe.¹²¹ The Europeans were also well aware of Süleyman's imperial aspirations. In 1527 in a speech before the Castilian Cortez, Gattinara listed the conquests of the Ottomans and reminded his audience that the sultan already ruled over an empire much larger than that of Alexander the Great or the Caesars, he continued by warning the Cortez that Süleyman was determined to build a world empire (*la monarchia de tudo el mundo*).¹²² However for some, especially the French, it appeared that Charles was the one determined to bring the world under his control and acted as an Alexander *redivivus*.¹²³ Charles's large territorial inheritance and aspirations made him the biggest threat to other European rulers and their countries, not Süleyman and the Ottomans.

After the Battle of Pavia in 1525, in which Francis became Charles's prisoner for two years, it appeared as though Charles was bent on European domination. The Emperor's dominance after the battle not only worried the French, but also the papacy and many Italian states. In conjunction with Pope Leo X, the Hapsburg and papal armies pushed the French out of Milan in November of 1521, and suzerainty over Milan reverted to Charles.¹²⁴ In 1522, Francis tried to reclaim Milan but was repulsed by Charles's armies.¹²⁵ In another attempt to regain the duchy, Francis personally commanded his men at the Battle of Pavia,

¹²¹ Ibid., 77.

¹²² Ibid., 99.

¹²³ Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*, 27.

¹²⁴ Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe*, 214.

¹²⁵ MacDonald, *Charles V*, 66-7.

and on February 24, 1525 was taken prisoner by the Hapsburg soldier, Charles de Lannoy.¹²⁶ Although the Emperor did not personally capture Francis, his troops' victory advanced his personal reputation and honor while also securing Hapsburg dominance of Italy. Francis was humiliated by losing the battle and by being taken captive, and in a letter to his mother he noted that "all that is left to me...is my honour and my life, which is safe."¹²⁷

Charles did not grant the French King his freedom until he agreed to the Treaty of Madrid on January 14, 1526. In return, Francis had to hand over his two eldest sons Francis III and Henry II. Francis also had to renounce his claims in Italy, Artois, Flanders, and Burgundy. However, handing Burgundy over to Charles was not a viable option for Francis, and as soon as he returned to France he declared the treaty illegal as it required him to surrender part of his royal patrimony, and it was also considered dishonorable because it was made under duress.¹²⁸ Although Francis lived with the stigma of being an unreliable treaty partner from 1526 until his death in 1547, he saw the Treaty of Madrid as a threat to his honor and hereditary lands.¹²⁹ For Francis and his supporters, his refusal of the treaty did not diminish his glory as a monarch, because it was not perceived as legitimate to begin with. In August of 1526, Charles declared to a French diplomat that Francis "has cheated me; he has acted neither as a knight nor as a nobleman, but basely. I demand that if he cannot fulfil his treaty, the Most Christian King should keep his word or become my prisoner again. It would be better for us to fight out this quarrel hand to hand than to shed so much Christian

¹²⁶ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, 103.

¹²⁷ Bonney, *The European Dynastic States*, 103.

¹²⁸ Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 83.

¹²⁹ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, 107.

blood.”¹³⁰ The disputes and skirmishes between Charles and Francis continued throughout their lives, and were also carried on by their successors into the seventeenth century.

On and off throughout Francis’s reign he claimed that he was dedicated to the fight against the Turk, however that did not stop him from making numerous alliances with the Ottomans, and from 1525 on Francis allied with them to counteract Hapsburg sovereignty.¹³¹ In February of 1526, the French sent Ambassador Jean Frangipani to Istanbul to inform the Sultan that if Francis submitted to Charles it would “make him the master of the world.” Frangipani returned with a friendly letter from Süleyman promising to lend aid to Francis, thus establishing an Ottoman and French alliance in order to counteract the power and claims of the Hapsburg Charles.¹³² For the Most Christian King of France, Charles’s hereditary lands and his position as Holy Roman Emperor endangered the balance of power within Europe, and this made him more of a threat and enemy than the Ottoman sultan. Therefore, Francis proclaimed that he could not “deny that I am most anxious to see the Turk remain very powerful and ready for war, not on his own account—for he is an infidel, and the rest of us are Christians—but to weaken the emperor’s power, force him to heavy expenditures, and reassure all other governments against so great an enemy.”¹³³

While the Franco-Ottoman alliance shocked many in Christendom, alliances between Muslim and Christian entities were not uncommon.¹³⁴ Especially during the classical age of the Crusades, it was normal for Christians to ally with Muslims against other Christians, and

¹³⁰ MacDonald, *Charles V*, 69-70.

¹³¹ Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*, 306-307.

¹³² Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 36.

¹³³ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 2, *The Sixteenth Century to the Reign of Julius III*, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society v. 161 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 392.

¹³⁴ MacDonald, *Charles V*, 73.

vice versa, based on territorial or sovereignty disputes. However, Hapsburg propaganda portrayed Francis as an international Judas, who betrayed Christendom for his own means. Despite this Charles also accepted the necessity of making deals with Islam in lieu of war.¹³⁵ In order to counteract Francis and Süleyman, the Emperor tried to establish relations with the Sultan's Safavid Shi'a Muslim rivals. In 1529, Charles's envoys met with Shah Tahmāsp I (1514—1576), but unlike the alliance between the French and the Ottomans the interactions between the Hapsburgs and Safavids had almost no positive or military effect.¹³⁶ For Charles, the Shah and Persia presented no physical or ideological threat to Charles or his kingdoms, whereas Süleyman and the Ottoman Turks did. Süleyman and Charles were not always at war with one another, and when they were busy with other problems within their territories they also understood the benefit of diplomacy over war.

Titulature played a large and significant role in emphasizing territorial claims and exerting power and legitimacy, and the titles that the European and Ottoman rulers gave to themselves and others was indicative of their rivalries.¹³⁷ For example, in Ottoman documents, Süleyman and İbrahim usually referred to Charles as the *kıral* (king) of Spain, whereas Francis was usually called *padişah* (emperor) of France. In Süleyman's relationship with the King of France, the sultan understood that he was the one in the position of power and immediately established this through titulature in his first correspondence with Francis after the Battle of Pavia. In order to establish his credibility and authority as a ruler, Süleyman began his letter by enumerating his titles and divinely appointed status:

¹³⁵ Ibid., 103.

¹³⁶ Subhi Labib, "The Era of Süleyman the Magnificent: Crisis of Orientation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10 no. 4 (1979): 446.

¹³⁷ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 40.

I who am the Sultan of Sultans, the sovereign of sovereigns, the dispenser of crowns to the monarchs on the face of the lord of the White Sea and the Black Sea, of Rumelia and of Anatolia, of Karamania, of the land of Rum, of Zulkadria, of Diarbekir, of Kurdistan, of Azerbaijan, of Persia, of Damascus, of Aleppo, of Cairo, of Mecca, of Medina, of Jerusalem, of all Arabia, of Yemen, and of many other lands which my noble forefathers and my glorious ancestors (may God light up their tombs!) conquered by the force of their arms, and sword and my victorious blade, I, Sultan Suleiman Khan, son of Sultan Selim Khan, son of Sultan Bayezid Khan.¹³⁸

For the Holy Roman Emperor and his Grand Chancellor, titulature was just as important in projecting and legitimizing Charles's sovereignty against the claims of Francis and Süleyman. Around 1530, Gattinara tailored Charles's imperial titles so that they would fit the different areas that he ruled over, and were translated into the vernacular of that region. While the titles differed from kingdom to kingdom, they all began with "By divine clemency King of the Romans and Emperor elect, semper Augustus," and listed the different areas that Charles ruled over. The German designation was originally in Latin and declared "Charles, by divine clemency King of the Romans, future Emperor, semper augustus, King of the Spaniards, Two Sicilies, Jerusalem, the Baleares, Canaries, the Indian islands and islands and firm lands in the Ocean Sea, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, etc."¹³⁹ Charles's assertion that he was the king of Jerusalem proved to be problematic, because in reality Süleyman controlled the city. Charles's claim to be the King of Jerusalem upset İbrahim and Süleyman since it was an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan, therefore the Grand Vizier conveyed his disgust to Hapsburg envoys:

Why does he enumerate with such arrogance the titles that are his, and those that are not his? Wherefore does he presume to style himself to my lord as King of Jerusalem? Is he ignorant of the fact that my mighty Emperor and not himself, Charles, is Lord of Jerusalem?...If my master should write down all the provinces that

¹³⁸ Roger Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1944), 130.

¹³⁹ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, 123.

are his, where would be the end to it? Nor would he usurp those of other people, as Charles does.¹⁴⁰

Not only was Charles's claim to be the King of Jerusalem problematic for Süleyman and İbrahim, but his title of emperor was as well. For the Ottoman sultan and his vizier the word "emperor" implied supremacy over all rulers, thus Charles's use of the term encroached upon Süleyman's sovereignty because in the eyes of him and İbrahim there could only be one legitimate emperor. In 1529, when Charles began to prepare for his official coronation as Holy Roman Emperor, İbrahim asked the Venetian *bailo* Pietro Zen, "How can there be an emperor other than my grand signor?"¹⁴¹ Due to Gattinara's and Charles's broad assertions of sovereignty, it was the Grand Vizier who was essential in helping Süleyman counteract these claims in a way familiar to Europeans.

During İbrahim's time as vizier, his close relationship and patronage with Venice was essential in helping Süleyman exert his sovereignty vis-à-vis Charles. İbrahim understood the benefit of utilizing the titulature and regalia of the Europeans, and therefore he sought European iconography for Süleyman to use in his competition with Charles, however, the same cannot be said for the latter. Even though Charles was battling Süleyman for the position of universal sovereign, he and his advisers did not make use of Ottoman regalia. Despite the Ottomans being a society not really interested in change, they were actually more open and accepting of other cultures than the Europeans. Since Süleyman was going head to head against the leader of the European Christians, İbrahim made sure that the sultan projected his claims through European means. Due to the Renaissance which also penetrated into the Ottoman Empire, the iconography from ancient Rome was used by both monarchs in

¹⁴⁰ Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent*, 123.

¹⁴¹ Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent," 411.

their bid for universal sovereignty. The idea of the Roman Empire played a large role throughout the rhetoric, iconography and regalia, and titlature that Charles and Süleyman used during their reigns. For these men, Roman iconography was central in legitimating and asserting their sovereignty.

As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles theoretically represented the continuation of the Roman Empire in western Europe, whereas the sultan portrayed himself as the inheritor of Rome based on the Ottomans holding the lands of the old Byzantine Empire. Therefore, Charles and Süleyman were rivals for the claim to be the true ruler of the Roman Empire. Since Charles was the first Emperor to be crowned outside of Rome, his coronation in Bologna in 1529 had to be ‘Romanized’ and legitimized so that his enemies could not declare it void.¹⁴² Instead of emphasizing his Hapsburg lineage, Charles employed Roman and antique iconography to present himself as a Roman emperor in the tradition of Caesar, Octavian, Titus, and Trajan.¹⁴³ Charles’s coronation was reminiscent of a Roman triumph, specifically Caesar's four day long triumphant in the spring of 46 B.C.E. in Rome, which celebrated his successful campaigns in Gaul, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Africa. As Charles entered the city, he rode under triumphal arches as the people greeted him with shouts of “Cesare, Cesare, Carlo, Carlo, Imperio, Imperio!”¹⁴⁴

The anonymous Venetian woodcut *Charles V's Entry into Bologna in 1529*, gives perfect insight into the Roman iconography that the Emperor utilized during his coronation (Fig. 6). This image depicted Charles dressed in armor with an eagle on his helmet and a scepter in his hand, along with four knights carrying a gold brocade canopy over his head.

¹⁴² Konrad Eisenbichler, “Charles V In Bologna: The Self-Fashioning of a Man and a City,” *Renaissance Studies* 13, no. 4 (1999): 433.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 432.

¹⁴⁴ Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent,” 410.

His pages also carried ceremonial helmets which had four plumed “helmets of Caesar” that featured the Hapsburg eagle and a crown.¹⁴⁵ The use of a golden eagle on Charles's helmet was strategic as it was commonly associated with the Greek (and Roman) god Zeus, and alluded to Charles's power. Not only did Charles's coronation advertise his claim to be Caesar of the Holy Roman Empire, but his joint procession with Pope Clement VII in 1530 promoted his claim for a universal empire (Fig. 7). Descriptions and images of Charles's joint procession with the pope also referred to triumphal arches, a gold brocade canopy, and a Crusader's flag showing Christ on a cross.¹⁴⁶ According to Guicciardini, this was “a day most propitious for the Emperor, for on that day he had been born, on that day he had taken the King of France prisoner, on that day he assumed the signs and ornaments of the imperial dignity.”¹⁴⁷ This parade and procession with the pope not only presented Charles as a triumphant Caesar, but also as the secular head and defender of Christendom.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 410.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, 426.



Figure 6. Anonymous, *Charles V's Entry into Bologna in 1529*, ca. 1530, from a series of Venetian woodcuts. Vienna, Albertina, Graphische Sammlung. From: Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *The Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (1989): 413.



The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles. ID no.: gri_p910002_item24_028. For higher resolution images visit: http://hdl.handle.net/10020/repro_perm.

Figure 7. Nicolaus Hogenberg, *Procession of Pope Clement VII and the Emperor Charles V after the coronation at Bologna on the 24th February, MDXXX*, ca. 1535-1539. Print, 40 prints in 1 scroll : etchings, engravings, watercolor, gouache, gold ; prints 39.5 x 29.7 cm, scroll 39.5 x 1241.3 cm. The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles. From: The Getty Research Institute Online, http://rosettaapp.getty.edu:1801/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE483735 (accessed June 06, 2017).

The news, art, and propaganda of Charles's coronation was widely circulated, and Süleyman and İbrahim paid close attention to his illustrious imperial claims. Even Francis expressed the sultan's distaste for Charles's use of Caesar in a conversation with a Venetian ambassador to the French court, "for Sultan Süleyman always says 'to Rome! To Rome!' and he detests the emperor and his title of Caesar, he, the Turk, causing himself to be called Caesar."¹⁴⁸ During İbrahim's time as grand vizier, he promoted the ideal of magnificence as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty.¹⁴⁹ Due to this, İbrahim employed Venetian artists to create European-Christian regalia for the sultan. According to a contemporary Italian source it was İbrahim who urged Süleyman to undertake a second siege of Vienna in 1532 in order to advertise his role as "*imperator del mondo*."¹⁵⁰ The most interesting aspect of Süleyman's procession into the city was the Venetian regalia that İbrahim commissioned for him. Even though items like crowns, scepters, orbs, and gold chains were foreign to the Ottomans, İbrahim understood the benefit of using western status symbols since they were helpful in communicating Ottoman imperial claims through European vocabulary.¹⁵¹ The regalia included horse furnishings, a scepter, a throne, and most notably a Venetian helmet-crown which were all pompously displayed when Süleyman entered Vienna, and similar to Charles's coronation, Süleyman incorporated Roman triumphal arches.

The most outstanding aspect of this procession, however, was Süleyman's Venetian helmet-crown (Fig. 8). Although it was fashioned with a tapering Islamic form and an Ottomanizing crescent-shaped aigrette, it most importantly resembled Charles's crown and

¹⁴⁸ Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent," 411.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 405-406.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 415. "... Ti fara Signore et padrone di tutta la Cristianita et della bella Italia...tale che ti fara monarcha del mondo"; Anon., Discorsi, fols. 48r-57v.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 425.

the pope's papal tiara (Fig. 9). Unlike the pope's tiara which only had three tiers, Süleyman's helmet-crown featured an additional fourth tier and was meant as a statement of superiority over Charles and the pope.¹⁵² Thus the helmet-crown served as a universal claim of world dominion meant to challenge Charles as the extra fourth crown indicated Ottoman supremacy. İbrahim and Süleyman were fully aware of the legitimizing role of crowns in the west, however, despite the prominence of the helmet-crown throughout Christian Europe, it did not play a large role in legitimizing Süleyman's rule throughout the Ottoman Empire. Since it was an alien aspect to the Ottomans it was left out of account by Ottoman contemporaries like historian Celâlazade, confirming that the helmet's message was directed at a western audience, especially Charles.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Ibid., 411.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 409.



Figure 8. Agostino Veneziano, *Portrait of Sultan Süleyman*, 1535. Engraving, 434 x 295 mm. The British Museum, London. From: The British Museum Online, http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1445084&partId=1 (accessed June 06, 2017).



Domenico del Riccio, known as Brusasorzi, details from a fresco depicting the coronation cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII, ca. 1564. Verona, Palazzo Ridolfi (from V. Filippini, *Il Palazzo Ridolfi e l'Affresco di Domenico Brusasorzi*, Verona, 1953, figs. 3, 6)



Figure 9. Domenico del Riccio (il Brusasorzi), details from a fresco depicting the coronation cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII, ca. 1564.

Found in Gülru Necipoğlu, “*Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry*,” *The Art Bulletin* 1, no. 3 (1989): 414, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.unm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=ba033312-31a4-4f4b-9e21-d4f2499ed1da%40sessionmgr103> (accessed June 06, 2017).

Although Süleyman attempted to siege Vienna twice in the hopes that he could engage the Emperor in battle, and Charles often proclaimed his desire to fight the Turk, the two rulers never came into contact. When Charles became Holy Roman Emperor he declared his ability for the preparation of a crusade against the Ottomans, but did not react to Süleyman’s victories at Belgrade and Rhodes.¹⁵⁴ In 1519, he delineated control of the Austrian hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs to his younger brother Ferdinand I, and the defense of Hungary and Austria fell to the Archduke.¹⁵⁵ Despite the apparent danger to the

¹⁵⁴ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, 96.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 158.

Germanies, Ferdinand could not rely on Charles due to his engagement with the Protestant conflict and his rivalry with Francis.¹⁵⁶ In leaving Ferdinand to defend Vienna, Charles also conveyed the message that the defense of the Roman Empire had no priority to him as an emperor.¹⁵⁷ The only times Charles actually turned his attention toward the Ottomans was when they posed a threat to his hereditary possessions in the Mediterranean. To the Sultan and the Emperor, war in the Mediterranean appeared to be more of an immediate advantage than continuing enterprises in the Danube.¹⁵⁸

In 1518, Selim officially put Khair-ad-Din Barbarossa (c. 1466-1546) and his corsair fleet under Ottoman protection. This greatly strengthened Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean, and by 1534 the Sultan appointed Barbarossa as Admiral of the Turkish fleet (Fig. 10).¹⁵⁹ When Barbarossa captured Tunis on August 17 of that same year, Charles saw this as a threat to the entire Mediterranean, especially Italy and Spain.¹⁶⁰ Not only did Barbarossa claim Tunis for the Ottomans, but he also displaced Charles's Muslim ally the Hafsid ruler, Mulay Hassan.¹⁶¹ Before Khair-ad-Din captured Tunis, his brother, Oruç Barbarossa (c. 1474-1518), made Algiers their base of operations after they ejected the Spaniards in 1516. After that, the Barbarossas were feared by Christians for their piracy along the coasts of Italy and Iberia.¹⁶² For Charles the safety of his hereditary lands in these two countries was top priority, and both expected him to protect them and their merchants

¹⁵⁶ V.J. Parry, "The Ottoman Empire, 1520-66," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 1, *The Reformation: 1520-1559*, ed. G.R. Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 515.

¹⁵⁷ Kleinschmidt, *Charles V*, 113.

¹⁵⁸ Parry, "The Ottoman Empire," 517.

¹⁵⁹ Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe*, 215; MacDonald, *Charles V*, 311.

¹⁶⁰ Hugh Thomas, *The Golden Empire: Spain, Charles V, and the Creation of America* (New York: Random House, 2010), 358.

¹⁶¹ Housley, *The Later Crusades*, 132.

¹⁶² Tracy, *Emperor Charles V*, 134.

from the attacks of Barbary Corsairs.¹⁶³ Even though Süleyman was not physically present for any of these campaigns, his rivalry with Charles was transformed into a struggle for the Mediterranean through Barbarossa.¹⁶⁴ Charles fully understood the value of Mediterranean commerce and sought to protect it whenever possible.¹⁶⁵ Since Tunis was the hub of the western Mediterranean, it was vital to Charles for the security of the trade routes between Spain and Italy, especially the Sicilian wheat trade.¹⁶⁶ For years the coasts and merchants of Italy and Spain had been harassed by Muslim corsairs, and it continued to get worse after Barbarossa captured Tunis. Due to this and the combined threat between Süleyman, Barbarossa, and Francis to Spanish hegemony in the Mediterranean, Charles decided to undertake his first campaign against the Ottoman Turks.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 133.

¹⁶⁴ Koenigsberger and Mosse, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, 45.

¹⁶⁵ Aurelio Espinosa, "The Grand Strategy of Charles V (1500-1558): Castile, War, and Dynastic Priority in the Mediterranean," *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, no. 3/4 (2005): 251.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 275.



Figure 10. Agostino Veneziano, *Portrait of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha*, 1535. Engraving, 44.8 x 30.5 cm. The Met Museum, New York. From: The Met Museum Online, <http://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/342972> (accessed June 06, 2017).

This image was commissioned by the Paşa. The artist's rendition is an example of a correct depiction of an Ottoman Turk, in contrast with the numerous depictions of Turkish figures that were Orientalized.

The Emperor's campaign in Tunis was the first time that he ever led his armies into battle. Although he officially began to rule his Burgundian territories in 1515, Castile and Spain in 1516, and was formally anointed as Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, he did not personally undertake his first military enterprise until 1535.¹⁶⁷ The expedition to Tunis was meant to be portrayed and perceived as a crusade against the Turk from the very beginning. As Charles began the preparations for his expedition, he hired Dutch artist, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen (1500-1559), to officially sketch important aspects of the campaign. Around 1548, the most prominent weaver in Brussels, Willem de Pannemaker (1512-1581), was selected to turn Vermeyen's sketches into an elaborate tapestry series known as the *Conquest of Tunis*.¹⁶⁸ The series highlighted Charles's role as defender of the Christian faith, and this was made clear in the second tapestry in which Christ is depicted as the true commander of the expedition, and in the eleventh which shows the Emperor as a victorious crusader.

The second tapestry is a portrait of the muster in Barcelona (Fig. 11), and in the middle ground there stands a knight holding onto a large banner portraying the Apocalyptic Woman (Fig. 12). The banner is somewhat unique because instead of featuring a crucified Jesus, the image is of Mary holding the Christ child "clothed in the sun with the moon at her feet, with part of the cross of St. Andrew also showing against the red ground."¹⁶⁹ This designated Christ as the commander of the expedition while also stressing Charles's role in defending Christendom. The eleventh tapestry specifically illustrated Charles in the role of the Christian knight. Here, Charles is modestly depicted in the middle of the image as a

¹⁶⁷ Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy*, 16-19.

¹⁶⁸ Hendrik J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries* (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989), 125.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 184.

triumphant crusader, and he is flanked by loyal knights carrying the standard of the crucified Christ as Moors kneel before him (Fig. 13).¹⁷⁰ While Charles's enterprise was mainly undertaken to secure his holdings in the western Mediterranean, he and his advisers understood the value in portraying it as a crusade aimed at the Muslim infidel.



Figure 11. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, *The Muster in Barcelona*, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J. Horn, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, *Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries* (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B45.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.



Figure 12. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, detail of banner portraying the Apocalyptic Woman in *The Muster of Barcelona*, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries* (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B46.




Figure 13. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, *The March to Rada*, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J. Horn, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, *Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries* (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B87.

Despite Charles revealing that the safety of his hereditary possessions in the Mediterranean were of more importance to him than those in eastern Europe, he also realized that the Ottomans were more of a threat to the safety of Christendom in the Mediterranean. Süleyman tried to siege Vienna twice, and was unable because of the distance from Istanbul, bad weather, and lack of supplies, whereas in the Mediterranean, Barbarossa was located much closer to Europe and dominated the seas. The Sultan and the Emperor both recognized that the Mediterranean was a more lucrative and substantial area to control, and both sought to exert their power there. The years 1520 to 1536 witnessed the most interaction between Charles and Süleyman, and this was further instigated by their imperial minded advisers

Gattinara and İbrahim Paşa. During their tenure, these men thoroughly influenced their masters by impressing upon them that they were meant for global domination. Although Charles never took too seriously the inflated imperial rhetoric and ideals that Gattinara posited, it appears that Süleyman was much more receptive to İbrahim's ideas of universal sovereignty. While Charles and Süleyman continued to present themselves as the defenders of their faiths until the ends of their reigns, the emphasis on universal sovereignty died with Gattinara and İbrahim.

Chapter 3: Religion and Heretics

At the beginning of the early modern period, Europe was still very much medieval and kings like Charles had to share their power with the institutions and nobles of each kingdom. In the Germanies, the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, and the Netherlands, Charles was bound by constitutional restraints. As a monarch Charles had significant control and privileges over his subjects, but as the Holy Roman Emperor he practically had no authority in the Germanies and was merely a figurehead. In reality, the various German princes held the true power according to Luther in a letter to a pastor in Cotbus in February 1539, “the Emperor is not a monarch and cannot depose the electoral princes nor alter the form of the Empire.”¹⁷¹ For Luther and his adherents, Charles shared his power with the German princes and this diluted his sovereignty. In contrast, Süleyman was a true emperor in every sense of the word. Due to the role of the Ottoman sultan and the make-up of the government, Süleyman wielded an absolute authority that did not appear in Europe until the seventeenth century. Süleyman was the undisputed head of government, so as the sultan it was he who appointed government and religious officials. The Hapsburg ambassador, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (1522-92), stayed in Istanbul during the later years of Süleyman’s reign and his letters give a compelling insight into the Ottoman Empire at this time. In his first letter, Busbecq noted how “the Sultan himself” assigned positions and offices to “men capable of performing them.”¹⁷² Therefore, unlike Charles, Süleyman could appoint and remove his own government officials and religious leaders (*sheikhu’l-islam*) as he saw fit without fear of consequence from his subjects.

¹⁷¹ Quoted in Cynthia Grant Shoenberger, “Luther and the Justifiability of Resistance to Legitimate Authority,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40, no. 1 (1979): 13.

¹⁷² Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *Turkish Letters* (London: Sickle Moon Books, 2001), 39.

In Europe, Charles faced opposition on many fronts. Not only did he have to compete with other monarchs like Francis I, but he also had to deal with the German princes whose autonomy was growing due to the spread of Lutheranism which encouraged practices that undermined his authority. While Luther mainly preoccupied himself with reforming the Roman Catholic Church, many German princes and electors began to resist the emperor. The religious schism between Luther and the Catholic Church encouraged debate on European political and religious ideologies, and as many German princes converted to Lutheranism they began to oppose Charles's reign and question his sovereignty. The German prince Philip I, Landgrave of Hesse, argued that in the Holy Roman Empire the emperor was limited by fundamental law and shared his control with the German princes.¹⁷³ As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles was elected to his position by the princes and he did not have the right to depose them, whereas Süleyman was the true emperor of his lands and had absolute authority.

In the beginning of Charles's and Süleyman's reigns a lot of their focus was on each other and combatting one another's claims to universal sovereignty. Both rulers were able to prove themselves militarily in battles against the other's religion, and due to this they presented themselves as the defenders of their faiths against the infidels. While the Sultan and the Emperor continued to fight on and off into the second half of their reigns, during a long decade centered on the 1540s, they both turned their attention from fighting each other to combatting heretics. For Süleyman the heretical Safavid Shi'a and their leader in Iran posed more of a threat to his empire and legitimacy as a Muslim ruler than did the Holy Roman Emperor and the Christians. While the Ottoman Sultan and his advisers considered

¹⁷³ Shoenberger, "Luther and the Justifiability," 9.

the Safavids to be worse than the Christians, the same cannot be said for the latter. Even though Charles regarded the Lutherans in Germany as heretics and wanted to bring them back into the fold of the Catholic Church, he often gave them concessions for military aide. For Charles, defending his patrimony against Francis and Süleyman was the main priority, and the Germans were vital as manpower for the Emperor's military campaigns against the French and Ottomans. It was when Francis and Süleyman no longer posed a direct threat to Charles that he turned his attention to the Lutheran problem in the Germanies.

Throughout Süleyman's time as sultan he conducted three campaigns against Shah Tahmasp and the Safavids in Iran. The first invasion began in 1534 and lasted until the following year, and due to this Charles was able to conduct his campaign to Tunis in 1535. The second phase lasted two years from 1546-48, and the third in 1554 ended with a formal peace, the Amasya Treaty in May 1555. The Safavids originated from within the Ottoman Empire during Bayezid II's sultanate, and posed a much larger danger than that of Christianity. In Busbecq's *Third Letter* he related a conversation between himself and Grand Vizier Rüstem:

I must now repeat another conversation which I had with Roostem, which will show you what a wide difference of religion exists between the Turks and Persians. [Rüstem] asked me once whether war was still going on between the Kings of Spain and France. When I replied in the affirmative, he said, 'What right have they to wage war against one another, when they are bound by religious ties?' 'The same right,' I replied, 'as you have to go to war with the Persians; there are cities, provinces, and kingdoms, about which they are at quarrel and have recourse to arms.' 'The cases are not parallel,' replied Roostem, 'I assure you that we abhor the Persians and regard them as more unholy than we regard you Christians.'¹⁷⁴

While the European Christians tended to regard the Muslims as worse than heretics, the Ottomans considered the Safavid Shi'a to be worse than Christians since they were more

¹⁷⁴ Busbecq, *Turkish Letters*, 83.

likely to rebel and cause chaos within the Ottoman Empire. During this time it was also much more likely that a subject within the Ottoman realms would convert to Shi'ism and support the Safavids than convert to Christianity. Not only were the Safavids located closer to the heart of the Ottoman Empire, but they also posed a religious and political threat to the legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan. Therefore, in opposition to the Safavids, especially during the second half of Süleyman's reign, propaganda portrayed them as heretics and enemies of true Sunni Islam and created a counter image of the Ottoman Sultan as the defender of the orthodox Islamic faith.¹⁷⁵

Unlike Charles and his rocky relationship with the Pope, Süleyman and his designated religious leader worked in tandem to legitimize and exert Süleyman's secular and religious claims. The religious leader of the Sunni Ottomans was known as the *mufti* of Istanbul, a position which the sultan appointed and emerged from obscurity in the fifteenth century. By Süleyman's reign the *mufti* became the supreme office in the Ottoman judicial hierarchy. In later centuries it also came to be known as the *sheikhu'l-islam*, and his chief function was to issue *fatwas* in response to questions from the sultan, ministers, governors, etc. Although his opinions did not have executive authority, before undertaking anything controversial the sultan would seek a *fatwa* from the *sheikhu'l-islam* to legitimize his actions. Süleyman had a close relationship with the two men who served in this position, Kemalpaşazade (1526-35) and Ebu's-su'ud (1545-74), and they played significant roles in helping legitimize Süleyman's wars against the Safavids and in presenting him as the orthodox defender of Sunni Islam.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 5.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

According to the Quran and Islamic jurists, war against the Christian infidels was perceived as just; however, it was trickier for the Ottoman sultan to justify battles against fellow Muslims. Due to this the *sheikhu'l-islam* played an important role in helping to justify Süleyman's campaigns against the Safavids. In an Arabic treatise Kemalpaşazade, who held the office of *sheikhu'l-islam* from 1526 to 1535, described the Safavids as having "the outward form of Muslims, but the inward nature of infidels."¹⁷⁷ He continued by noting that "they claim that what the shah makes licit is licit, and what the shah makes forbidden is forbidden. If the shah makes wine licit, then it is licit. In short, the varieties of their unbelief, transmitted to us through what is common knowledge, cannot be numbered... We have no doubt about their unbelief and apostasy..."¹⁷⁸ Although much of what Kemalpaşazade said about the Safavids in this text is largely imagined, it not only reveals the grievances that the Ottomans had but also demonstrates how Süleyman and his advisers sought to present the Safavid Shah and his followers as rebels and bad Muslims in comparison to the devout Ottomans. By listing the multiple heresies of the Safavids and designating them as infidels, Kemalpaşazade was able to contend in regard to a question on the legality of war that it would be considered "a major *gaza*."¹⁷⁹ This justification was continued by Kemalpaşazade's successor Ebu's-su'ud who also presented Süleyman as the bastion of orthodox Islam and in a *fatwa* he too designated battle against the Safavids as holy war:

Is it licit according to the *shari'a* to fight the followers of the Safavids? Is the person who kills them a holy warrior, and the person who dies at their hands a martyr?

Answer: Yes, it is a great holy war and glorious martyrdom.

¹⁷⁷ Quoted in Colin Imber, "Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History," in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London: Longman, 1995), 147.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

Another question: Assuming that it is licit to fight them, is this simply because of their rebellion and enmity against the [Ottoman] Sultan of the People of Islam, because they drew the sword against the troops of Islam, or what?

Answer: They are both rebels, and from many points of view, infidels.¹⁸⁰

Ebu's-su'ud declared that the Safavids and their followers were infidels, an opinion that made war not only licit but obligatory. However, while Kemalpaşazade was instrumental in helping Süleyman religiously legitimize his wars, it was Ebu's-su'ud who formulated Süleyman's claims to spiritual and imperial dominion.¹⁸¹

From 1545 until his death in 1574, Ebu's-su'ud played a central role in helping the Ottoman sultan justify and exert his spiritual and secular claims. It was he as *sheikhu'l-islam* who portrayed hostilities against the Safavids as holy war, and created the titles which ultimately expressed Süleyman's religious and political sovereignty. Although the Ottoman sultans began to use the title of *caliph* as early as 1421 with Mehmed I, it was Ebu's-su'ud who invoked the theory of the Caliphate and bestowed this title on the Ottoman Sultan.¹⁸² Originally for Sunni theologians, the concept of the 'Caliphate' came from the need to counter the claims of the Shi'a and other heretical groups. Sunni Muslims believed in the idea of the caliphate which asserted the legitimacy of the first three of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs ('Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, and 'Ali), whereas the Shi'a completely disregarded the first three caliphs and believed that the Prophet designated his son-in-law 'Ali to be his immediate successor. Since the Shi'a did not recognize the first three Rightly Guided Caliphs, the theory of the caliphate was created to defend Sunni dogma and the legitimacy of Sunni rule against heretics.¹⁸³ As a religious jurist, Ebu's-su'ud inherited these

¹⁸⁰ Quoted in Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud*, 86.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 99-101.

traditional concepts of the position of the caliphate and adapted them for the Ottoman sultan as a means to enhance his authority and to assert his primacy over other Islamic rulers.¹⁸⁴ At this time, to describe Süleyman as the caliph had an ideological function of justifying his secular rule in Islamic terms, and had the actual result of enhancing his powers.¹⁸⁵

By presenting Süleyman as the caliph, the Ottoman sultan served as the supreme head of the Islamic community against the infidels and heretics. Taking this title also implied that the sultan had claim to an authority over the interpretation and implementation of the *shari'a*. Therefore in the Law-Book of Buda of 1541, Ebu's-su'ud claimed that Süleyman was the one "who makes smooth the path for the precepts of the manifest shari'a" and also "makes manifest the Exalted Word [of God]."¹⁸⁶ In stating this, Ebu's-su'ud emphasized the idea that not only had Süleyman been divinely appointed by God, but it was his duty as sultan to interpret and execute God's law on earth. To further add legitimacy to the claim that Süleyman was chosen by God, Ebu's-su'ud declared in the dedication preface to his commentary on the Quran that the Ottoman Sultan was the person who "God Most High has bestowed the Caliphate of the Earth."¹⁸⁷ According to Ebu's-su'ud it was God who designated the Ottoman dynasty with the caliphate in direct succession with the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and this assertion helped to give Süleyman religious legitimacy and dominance over other Muslim rulers like the Safavid Shah of Iran.

The Süleymaniye mosque is a perfect example of the physical embodiment of Süleyman's claim to sovereignty over Muslims and Christians, and it was Ebu's-su'ud who most successfully formulated this assertion in the inscription over the portal of the mosque.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 106.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 271.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 98.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 105.

In 1547, the Sultan concluded a treaty with Emperor Charles and his brother Ferdinand, in which they agreed to pay tribute for the lands they continued to hold in Hungary, and it appears that immediately after this Süleyman laid the plan for the mosque which was finished in 1557.¹⁸⁸ He commissioned Ebu's-su'ud to write the inscription, and in doing so the *sheikhu'l-islam* attempted to assert and legitimize Süleyman's power and authority through titles:

[Sultan Süleyman] has drawn near to [God], the Lord of Majesty and Omnipotence,/ the Creator of the World of Dominion and Sovereignty,/ [Sultan Süleyman] who is His slave, made mighty with Divine Power,/ the Caliph, resplendent with Divine Glory,/ Who performs the Command of the Hidden Book/ and executes its Decrees in [all] regions of the inhabited quarter./ Conqueror of the Lands of the Orient and the Occident/ with the Help of Almighty God and His Victorious Army,/ Possessor of the Kingdoms of the World, Shadow of God over all Peoples, Sultan of the Sultans of the Arabs and the Persians,/ Promulgator of Sultanic *Qanuns*,/ Tenth of the Ottoman *Khaqans*,/ Sultan son of the Sultan, Sultan Süleyman Khan/.../ May the line of his Sultanate endure until the End of the Line of the Ages!/¹⁸⁹

Since Ebu's-su'ud was restricted by space, he chose only the most important titles and utilized this inscription to emphasize that Süleyman was ruler by both secular and divine right. Süleyman's position as the Ottoman sultan was an equal mixture of religious and secular power and authority, whereas Charles's position as Holy Roman Emperor was becoming more and more secularized.

Even though Charles and his advisers, like Gattinara, asserted that he was chosen by God to serve as king and Holy Roman Emperor, his role was far more secular than religious. In Catholic Christendom the Pope was the religious leader of the Church and its members, and the Holy Roman Emperor served as the secular extension of the papacy. While there had always been a religious connotation to the position of the Holy Roman Emperor it was

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 74-75.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 75.

increasingly becoming more secularized during the sixteenth century especially due to the spread of Lutheranism in the Germanies. While men like Luther supported Charles in his position as Holy Roman Emperor, they emphasized that his role was secular and not religious. In 1523, Luther published his tract *Temporal Authority: To What Extent it should be Obeyed* after Charles commanded him to recant his beliefs and works at the Diet of Worms in 1521. In order to explain the nature of temporal authority and its limitations, Luther claimed that “God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace.”¹⁹⁰ Charles’s position as Emperor did not coincide with religion and was purely secular, as a temporal authority the Emperor’s job was to “bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds” not to “produce righteousness.”¹⁹¹ According to Luther, since Charles was only a temporal prince he did not have the right to condemn the Lutheran movement, and urged his followers to resist the Emperor.

If your prince or temporal ruler commands you to side with the pope, to believe thus and so, or to get rid of certain books, you should say, “It is not fitting that Lucifer should sit at the side of God. Gracious sir, I owe you obedience in body and property; command me within the limits of your authority on earth, and I will obey. But if you command me to believe or to get rid of certain books, I will not obey; for then you are a tyrant and overreach yourself, commanding where you have neither the right not authority,” etc.¹⁹²

Luther was able to publish texts like this because Charles did not have any real power in the Germanies, and the Emperor could do nothing to stop him and Luther’s support from various German princes. Although Charles’s propagandists presented him as the paladin of

¹⁹⁰ Martin Luther, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent it should be Obeyed,” in *Luther Selected Political Writings*, ed. J.M. Porter (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 55-56.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 62.

Christendom and as a sovereign with universal power, as the Holy Roman Emperor he was merely a figurehead who exerted no control, and Luther and the spread of Protestantism was a perfect example of this. Even though Luther did not believe that Charles should wage a spiritual war against the Turks, in *Vom Kriege* he noted that the Emperor's role as a temporal and secular ruler meant that "if there is to be war against the Turk, it should be fought at the emperor's command, under his banner, and in his name. Then everyone can be sure in his conscience that he is obeying the ordinance of God, since we know that the emperor is our true overlord and head and that whoever obeys him in such a case obeys God also, whereas he who disobeys him also disobeys God."¹⁹³ Even though Luther had qualms about Charles's role as emperor, he ultimately supported him as a temporal authority, because for Luther the Pope was the real enemy, not Charles.

For Catholics the true leader of Christendom was the Pope, and the Holy Roman Emperor was his secular counterpart. During the sixteenth century the ambitions of the popes reached an apogee with men like Julius II and Clement VII, who were more like medieval princes than clergymen, and because of this they played a large role in the politics of early modern Europe. While Charles came into conflict with various popes who filled the position throughout his reign, his main problem was with Pope Clement VII (1523-34). Clement hailed from the powerful de' Medici family of Florence, and his underlying motive of enlarging the power of his family often brought him into conflict with the emperor. In theory, the relationship between the pope and the emperor was meant to be symbiotic and both were supposed to work together for the good of Christendom. In reality, Charles's territorial hegemony and secular power threatened that of Clement, so he often sought to

¹⁹³ Luther, "On War Against the Turk," 129.

counterbalance Charles by supporting Francis. However, whenever the tides turned against the monarch he was allied with, he was quick to change to the side that better aided his political power.

Clement's indecisive political moves led to a crisis in 1527 with the Sack of Rome (Fig. 14). Charles's armies had not been paid for several months and grew rebellious, and on May 6, 1527 a group of Spanish Catholics and Lutherans ransacked Rome. According to Guicciardini in *The History*, "as soon as they entered the city, the imperials began to run about tumultuously in search of booty, respecting neither friends nor the authority and dignity of prelates, nor even churches, monasteries, and relics, honored by pilgrims from all over the world, nor sacred things."¹⁹⁴ The pope expected his ally Francis to send troops to protect the Vatican, but he too was in debt and unable to help. The pope surrendered soon after the armies arrived and was a prisoner until December 1527. In turn, Clement made a deal with Charles in which "the Pontiff was to pay 400,000 ducats to the army" for his life and surrendered a few cities to the emperor.¹⁹⁵ Militarily the pope's army and guards were not strong enough to fight off the attack from the north, so even though the pope did have military power, his was not as powerful as that of the emperors. The papacy was reliant on the monarchs for additional power and safety, without the support of a monarch even the pope was in danger. Charles, however, also depended on the pope to legitimize his sovereignty through the Church. Although Charles was elected emperor in 1519, it was not until 1530 during the joint procession with Pope Clement VII, that Charles was

¹⁹⁴ Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 386.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 389.

acknowledged as Holy Roman Emperor. In spite of the nasty relations between Charles and Clement VII, both acknowledged the interdependency of their positions.



Figure 14. Simonzio Lupi, *Clement VII imprisoned in Castel Sant'Angelo treating for release*, 1527, c. 1556 - c. 1575. Miniature in colors and gold, 200 x 290 mm. The British Library, London (f. 8). From: The British Library Online, <http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IIIID=18196>

A miniature of a scene from the illuminated manuscript *Triumphs of Emperor Charles V: Clement VII imprisoned in Castel Sant'Angelo treating for release*, 1527.

While the relationship between Süleyman and his *sheikhu'l-islam* was also interdependent, the Ottoman religious leader did not pose a threat to Süleyman's autonomy and served as an extension of the sultan's divine authority. Men like Ebu's-su'ud were put in their positions in order to help legitimize Süleyman as a secular and religious ruler, and were

there to serve the sultan. Unlike the pope who wielded a significant amount of political power and was ultimately concerned with his own interests, the role of the *sheikhu'l-islam* was to aide the sultan since it was he who was the supreme head of the entire Ottoman Empire. The Holy Roman Emperor, on the other hand, was merely a prestigious title and as a sovereign could barely exert his control in the Holy Roman Empire. Even until the end of Charles's reign he and his followers utilized propaganda and rhetoric to portray him as a conquering ruler who's power knew no bounds when in reality he never truly dominated any of his opponents, and as emperor he was merely a figurehead. Most of Charles's most important military successes that contributed to his glory as a monarch were in fact the result of men like Duke Charles III of Bourbon and the Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria. Even though Charles and his armies defeated Francis at the Battle of Pavia, recaptured Tunis at the expense of Süleyman, and beat the Lutherans at the Battle of Muhlberg, these victories did not shift the balance of power nor did they curb the ambitions of his enemies.

Despite Charles's triumphs, not having any decisive outcome in the struggles with the French, Ottomans, and Protestants and the fact that he abdicated a defeated man, his reign was presented as triumphant and his victories were lauded. In 1556, the same year that Charles abdicated, the Flemish printer Hieronymus Cock published a commemorative set of engravings by Dirk Volkertsz Coornhert in honor of Charles V and his various victories. The most impressive of the plates is an image of Charles amidst his vanquished adversaries: Süleyman, Pope Clement VII, Francis I, the dukes of Cleves and Sacony, and the landgrave of Hesse (Fig. 15). In this image, the Emperor sits atop an eagle between two pillars while holding a sword and orb flanked by his six tethered foes. This was an ironic piece of propaganda for the tired and dejected Emperor, considering he never truly conquered the

French King, much less the Ottoman Sultan. Charles and his propagandists had to work within the realm of theory when it came to the portrayal of the emperor's power and authority, since there were too many factors that actually limited him as a monarch.

The way that the government of the Holy Roman Empire was set up limited Charles's ability to exercise any type of control, thus making him more of a European figurehead than anything else. Even though he and his advisers emphasized the fact that he was a secular and religious leader, he had no true authority in the realm of religion and had to share his position with the pope. In contrast, due to the setup of the Ottoman Empire, Süleyman was a true emperor and Islamic sovereign. While the role of the sultan had always been intertwined with religion, it was especially during Süleyman's reign that this was capitalized on and emphasized. Unlike the emperor and the pope, the Ottoman ruler and his *sheikhu'l-islam* worked in tandem to not only legitimize the sultan's role as political and religious leader but also to bring the position prestige.



Figure 15. Dirk Volkertsz Coornhert, *The Victories of Emperor Charles V*, 1555. Engraving, 153 x 228 mm. The British Museum, London. From: The British Museum Online, http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1527563&partId=1

Emperor Charles V sits amongst his conquered adversaries. Here he sits on an eagle and is flanked by six tethered foes.

Conclusion

A tired and overwhelmed Charles officially abdicated his position as Holy Roman Emperor in September 1556 to his brother Ferdinand. In 1554, Charles began to renounce his various thrones, beginning with Sicily and Naples, then the Netherlands in 1555 in favor of his son Philip II. Two years later, Charles further endowed Philip with the Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile and its New World possessions. Charles's decision to bestow upon the heavily Catholic Philip Spain and the Protestant Netherlands helped determine the tumultuous history of these two territories in the rest of the early modern period. Similar to the Germanies for Charles, the Netherlands became a major point of conflict for Philip and eventually led to their independence. Throughout Charles's reign as Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, he was much more successful and respected as the sovereign of Castile and Aragon than as the figurehead of the Holy Roman Empire. Even though the title of emperor held a certain amount of prestige throughout Europe, as the ruler of Spain Charles held more power and authority than he did in the Germanies. The Lutheran heresy that began at the start of Charles's reign was his ultimate undoing.

In combatting his enemies like the German princes, Francis I, and Süleyman, Charles really only won one significant battle against each of them that resounded to his honor and glory. The rest of his campaigns against his foes were not very successful and did not have any outstanding or long term outcomes. The Emperor's recapture of Tunis in 1535 was overturned by the Ottomans in 1574, and his triumph at the Battle of Mühlberg in 1547 had no decisive effect on stopping the spread of Protestantism in the Germanies. By the time Charles abdicated, not only was he sick, but he realized and readily understood his failures,

therefore he decided to exit the scene completely and retired to a monastery in Yuste, Spain where he died in September 1558.

While Charles had some successes throughout his time as a monarch, he ended his life in defeat that he acknowledged. Upon his abdication from the emperorship he noted in his speech that:

I had no inordinate ambition to rule a multitude of kingdoms, but merely sought to secure the welfare of Germany, to provide for the defence of Flanders, to consecrate my forces to the safety of Christianity against the Turk and to labor for the extension of the Christian religion. But although such zeal was mine, I was unable to show so much of it as I might have wished, on account of the troubles raised by the heresies of Luther and the other innovators of Germany and on account of serious war into which the hostility and envy of neighboring princes had driven me, and from which I have safely emerged, thanks to the favor of God.... In order that I might not be wanting in my duty I risked my strength, my goods, my repose, and my life for the safety of Christianity and the defence of my subjects....¹⁹⁶

This was a perfect summary of his goals and failures, and although he never fully adhered to Gattinara's notions of universal sovereignty, as a young ruler he had been much more optimistic about his abilities to unite Christendom and stop his enemies. Immediately, at a young age, his advisers and propagandists professed that he was destined to be the "Last World Emperor" with the power to restore peace and usher in the end of times. This belief was built more on the fact that Charles had inherited an unprecedented amount of land than on his actual capabilities as a sovereign. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the makeup of Europe was still very much feudal and medieval which further inhibited Charles's authority. In the realm of theory, Charles was a glorious and victorious emperor whose power knew no bounds, but in reality he was bound by various constitutional restraints and was not as successful as his propaganda presented him to be.

¹⁹⁶ Charles V, "Abdication Speech, Brussels (1556)," in *The European Reformations Sourcebook*, ed. Carter Lindberg (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002), 161-162.

Süleyman, on the other hand, proved to be a truly successful ruler and actually lived up to his purported potential. Indeed, there were times that Ottoman propaganda exaggerated the Sultan's victories such as his two sieges of Vienna. Despite the fact that the second siege of Vienna was not a definitive triumph for Süleyman, it was presented as a glorious win to the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Although this may not have been an actual military victory for Süleyman, he was extremely successful in advertising his universal sovereignty to Europe. Süleyman actually believed in his ability to be a universal sovereign on a global scale, and his military conquests in the west and east made it appear at the time as though it was possible. Süleyman added many new territories to his empire during his time as sultan, since he not only had the military prowess but also power to back up his claims, whereas Charles did not and his campaigns were undertaken to defend his patrimony. While Charles retired from his position as ruler and died shortly after, Süleyman continued to govern the empire and conduct military campaigns up until his death. A seventy-one year old Süleyman died September 6, 1566 in command of an expedition to Hungary, in which the Ottomans were triumphant at the Battle of Szigetvár. For centuries, the role of the Ottoman sultan revolved around being a ruler and an able military commander, unlike that of the Holy Roman Emperor which had devolved to an honorary political position.

Süleyman was able to wield political and religious authority based on the makeup of the Ottoman government and its relationship with Islam. Even though the Ottoman sultans utilized Islam to religiously legitimize their rule since the beginning on the frontier, it was Selim's conquest of the Mamluk Empire that gave the Ottoman sultan true religious authority over other Muslims. Selim's takeover of Mecca and Medina made the Ottoman ruler the premier Muslim authority, and further justified his wars against other Muslims like the

Safavids. These victories in the east paved the way for Süleyman to become the greatest and most powerful ruler of the early modern period. While it was Selim who helped the Ottoman Empire transition from a peripheral state into the head of the Islamic community, it was Süleyman who truly capitalized on these developments.

The European perception of the Turk began to harden during Selim's reign as a result of his rapid military victories. Though Selim never turned his attention to the west during his time as sultan, he inspired a fear that had not been witnessed since Mehmed II conquered Constantinople. Throughout all of Europe in the later Middle Ages and early modern period, the Christians were well aware of the Ottoman's impressive victories and the brutalities they incurred, and this further contributed to the negative rhetoric and perception of the Turk and Muslim which had been developing for centuries. The Ottoman Turks were unlike any previous Muslim foe, because almost from the beginning since 1352 they had been involved in European affairs and encroaching upon Christian territory. The first half of the sixteenth century was vital in the evolution of the European perception of the Turk due to Selim and his successor. While Christendom was initially led to believe that Süleyman was a prince of peace, his swift conquests in the beginning of his reign made him and his army the terror and scourge of Europe, especially for the Germans.

Since Süleyman's victories in Hungary in 1521 and 1526 brought him dangerously close to the Holy Roman Empire, the negative rhetoric of the Turk specifically flourished in the Germanies as evidenced by the numerous *Turkenbüchlein* that were published during his reign. According to the Germans, Süleyman was determined to bring them under his control, and his two sieges of Vienna made it appear as though that was what he intended to do.

Despite the problems between the Lutherans and Charles, their common enemy was the

Turks not each other. Even though the Germans truly feared and despised the Ottomans and their sultan, Süleyman played a significant but indirect role in the spread of Lutheranism in the Germanies. Charles's actions reveal that his main priorities were combatting the ambitions of the French King and Ottoman Sultan, not the Lutheran heresy. The Spaniards and the Germans made up most of the Emperor's armies, and in order to maintain his hereditary territories he needed them to fight for him. Therefore, whenever Charles needed the Protestants help as manpower against Francis or Süleyman, he would give them concessions and limit his restrictions on their faith and practices. However as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles did not exert a religious authority like the Ottoman sultan, and it was not within his power or control to stop the Lutherans in the Germanies.

Both Charles and Süleyman are perfect representations of their cultures, ideals, faiths, and time. These men were archetypes of their age, and best represent the early modern period's unique ideals and customs. On the perceived global stage between Europe and the Middle East, these two rulers went head to head as representatives of their respective regions and religions. Although the Sultan and the Emperor devoted a lot of their manpower against the other and spent much of their time counteracting the other's ambitions, they never actually came into physical contact and interacted in the realm of rhetoric and theory. While Charles attempted to express his dominion over Europe and Süleyman through propaganda, rhetoric, and iconography, he was not capable of exerting an absolute authority like that of the Ottoman sultan. The rights and liberties of the various kingdoms that Charles inherited and the Holy Roman Empire prohibited the ruler from exerting an absolute power like the Ottoman sultan's. The makeup of the Ottoman government and its marriage to Islam,

especially during Süleyman's reign, is what enabled him to be the most powerful ruler in Europe and the Middle East.

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